

The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

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The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

A Service Quarterly for Teachers and Students of History

Vol. XXX

March, 1952

No. 3

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JESUIT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Few Bibliographical References on the Jesuits for the History Teacher

E. J. BURRUS

Library
has been
checked

The purpose of this list is to help orientate the busy teacher of history in high school and college in the extensive and often crowded area of Jesuit bibliography. Part I will catalog the more important general reference works and periodical literature. Part II will list in alphabetical order a few of the more important topics on which reference material might be desired in a history course.

In Part II, unless expressly stated to the contrary, the entry is found in L. Koch S.J., *Jesuitenlexikon. Die Gesellschaft Jesu, einst and jetzt*. (Paderborn 1934), a handy volume arranged in alphabetical order and dealing briefly with the history, activity and organization of the past and present, its more prominent members, along with a fairly copious bibliography. It quite naturally emphasizes the German contribution. Very much needed for Jesuit bibliography is an English translation that would do justice to the contributions of other assistancies, bring the work up to date and correct the inaccuracies of the original.

It is quite obvious that this list offers only a few samplings, by way of introduction to an extensive subject. A sustained effort has been made to give the teacher useful and representative references rather than amass a large number of merely arbitrary ones. The compiler has been helped by Father Edmond Lamalle's *L'Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus. Notes Bibliographiques*. (Brussels 1930). It was supplemented by his manuscript notes, indexes and personal direction. To save space, only the initials are prefixed to the surname of authors of reference works.

Note: The Historical Bulletin begins in this issue a bibliography of the history and work of the Society of Jesus. This project has been prepared by the Jesuit Institute of History in Rome under the direction of Father E. J. Burrus, S.J. No similar work is available in English. This first installment deals with the history of the Order. Subsequent installments will treat, in an alphabetical arrangement, the various works and problems connected with the story of the Jesuits over the past four centuries. The completed bibliography will comprise an authoritative and invaluable aid to all students and teachers of history.

Despite the vast bibliography on the Order, there are still numerous lacunae; the compiler has not always been able to resist the temptation to call attention to one of these in the hope of encouraging teachers and graduate students to reduce their number.

This reference list deals with but one religious Order; a longer one could have been drawn up of each of the other religious Orders that had accomplished much for God and man before the Society of Jesus was founded.

PART I

General accounts dealing with the entire history of the Order:

**Synopsis historiae Societatis Jesu* [no author given] (Louvain 1950) is an extensive outline of the Order from the birth of Ignatius Loyola in 1491 to 1940, arranged in parallel columns giving the pertinent contemporary and general ecclesiastical history along with that of the Jesuits. Detailed indexes make it a handy reference tool for the history teacher who wishes to correlate historical events.

*M. P. Harney S.J., *The Jesuits in History* (New York 1941), gives the historical background, foundation of the Order and its history to 1940 with pertinent references in the course of the book and an excellent bibliography at the end. An index of names and materials helps for handy consultation. It is distinctly superior in most instances to the well known:

*T. J. Campbell S.J., *The Jesuits* (New York 1921), which could not draw on nearly as many sources as Father Harney's history.

*H. Becher S.J., *Die Jesuiten, Geschichte und Gestalt des Orden* (Munich 1951), is an excellent and up to date general account that emphasizes the spirit that animates the Order. A needed counterbalance to Fülöp-Miller.

*R. Fülöp-Miller, *Macht und Geheimnis der Jesuiten* (Leipzig-Munich 1929); English translation, *The Power and Secret of the Jesuits* (New York 1930). This is a popular account with a rather ostentatious parade of erudition that exaggerates the role of the will in Ignatian spirituality as well as in the apostolate of the Order. It is blind to the supernatural and to the principles that really animate the Order. It contains numerous illustrations found with difficulty elsewhere, but many chosen seemingly for their sensationalism. See study of same by expert in *Archivum Historicum S.I.* I (1932), 138-142.

*H. Boehmer, *Studien zur Geschichte der Gesellschaft Jesu*, I Band, *Loyola* (Bonn 1914). This study along with *Die Jesuiten* (Leipzig 1921), by this same Protestant theologian and historian will be found in nearly every instance more reliable than Fülöp-Miller.

*J. Crétineau-Joly, *Histoire religieuse, politique et littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 6 vols. (Paris 1844-46), journalistic, polemical, eulogistic, composed in an incredibly short time. The whole work suffers from these fundamental defects; yet it became one of the most popular histories of the Order and saw numerous translations. Consult J. Burnichon II, 449-57 for a scholarly evaluation. Patterned on Crétineau-Joly is:

*[Barbara Neave], *The Jesuits. Their Foundation and History* by B.N., 2 vols. (London 1879).

**Historia Societatis Iesu* is in eight volumes by the Jesuits N. Orlandini, Fr. Sacchini, P. Poussines, J. Jouvancy, J. Cordara (Cologne 1615-Rome 1750) and supplement by P. Ragazzini (Rome 1859). This is an official compilation sponsored by the Order; the authors had access to authentic sources. A résumé dealing with the years 1540-1616 was made by the same J. Jouvancy, *Epitome historiae Societatis Jesu*, 4 vols. (Ghent 1853).

*A most engaging yet accurate account of the early years of the Order is to be found in J. Brodrick S.J., *The Origin of the Jesuits* (taking in the years 1491-1556, the lifetime of Ignatius) and *The Progress of the Jesuits* (continuing their history to 1579), (London-New York-Toronto 1940-1946).

*J. Brucker S.J., *La Compagnie de Jésus, esquisse de son institut et de son histoire 1521-1773* (Paris 1919). A reliable general account of the Order previous to the suppression by a careful historian, with excellent analysis of various periods, events, activities and organizations.

A new era in the compilation of Jesuit history opened in 1892 when the 24th General Congregation urged the new General Luis Martín to have the history of the Order written from authentic sources and according to assistencies. Such works were to be objective, impartial and compiled with scientific accuracy. An excellent brief account of this new history is F. Van Ortroy S.J., *Une nouvelle histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus* in *Analecta Bollandina* 28 (1909), 91-104.

These histories were to go up to the time of the suppression

(July 21, 1773), but in some instances not even this date was reached.

Spanish Assistency. A Astráin S.J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la Asistencia de España*, 7 vols. (Madrid 1902-25). This history takes in the years 1540-1758. Besides giving a well documented history of the Jesuits in Spain, much of importance pertaining to the entire Order will be found in the seven volumes. Thus, the first volume is a detailed life of the Founder. Subsequent volumes give an accurate account of missionary activity in the Spanish Colonies (Florida, New Spain or Mexico, South America, the Philippines and the Marianas). Movements that affect the whole Order find as a rule masterly analysis and adequate treatment, such as the Ratio Studiorum and the noisy Controversy on Grace.

Italian Assistency. P. Tacchi Venturi S.J., *Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia*, 2 vols. (latest edition Rome 1950-1951). Particularly valuable for the history teacher is the excellent account of conditions prevailing in Italy at the time of Ignatius. The volumes deal with the Italian Assistency only during the lifetime of the Founder; the collection is being continued by M. Scaduto S.J.

German Assistency. B. Duhr S.J., *Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge*, 4 vols. (Freiburg-Munich 1907-28) has to do with the German-speaking countries from the beginning of the Order to its suppression. Considered unequalled in entire series for penetrating analysis of religious, social and political conditions. Organization of materials and style are not of this same high standard. The first two volumes contain numerous illustrations that enhance the value of the collection.

English Assistency. No history has yet been published. Until such is issued, the following must be consulted: H. Foley S.J., *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus*, 8 vols. (London 1877-9). These records deal with the 16th and 17th century. "L'édition manque de critique et sa technique est défectueuse, mais dans les documents publiés par le frère Foley, on trouve les éléments de la biographie de presque tous les jésuites anglais aux temps de la persécution, récits de leur apostolat, de leur captivité, de leur martyre. L'auteur ajoute des identifications et de précieux compléments. La collection manque de l'ordre, mais a d'assez bonnes tables. Le t. VIII a comme appendice: *Chronological Catalogues of the Irish Province* par le P. Hogan." (E. Lamalle, o.c., 18).

French Assistency. H. Fouqueray S.J., *Historie de la Compagnie de Jésus en France 1528-1762*, 5 vols. (Paris 1910-1925). The death of the author prevented the completion of this work. It stops with the death of Louis XIII (1643). The first volume takes in the years 1528-75, "les origines et les premières luttes" (Ignatius at Paris, the University of Paris opposes the establishment of the Jesuits); the second, "la ligue et le bannissement" 1575-1604 (new colleges, Henry III, the Huguenots, Father Auger at the Royal Court); the third takes in "l'époque de progrès" 1604-23 (Henry IV-Louis XIII, establishment of numerous colleges, as La Flèche, Dijon etc.); the fourth "sous le ministère de Richelieu" 1623-34 (renewed opposition of the U. of Paris, new colleges founded, missions to Canada and martyrs, Constantinople, Smyrna); the fifth continues the previous theme to the last days of Louis XIII 1634-43 (the origins of Jansenism).

Portuguese Assistency. F. Rodrigues S.J., *História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal*, 7 vols. (Porto 1931-50). The eighth volume is being made ready for the press. The entire work is to take in the history of the assistency from its origins to the expulsion of the Order from the Portuguese dominions in 1759. Emphasis is on the home country with brief treatment of the missions in Africa, the Orient and Brazil.

The following incomplete accounts deal with the new assistencies, i.e. North American, Slavic and Latin American, or the modern history of the old assistencies, i.e. Spanish, German, Italian, French, Portuguese. L. Frías S.J., *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en su asistencia moderna de España*, 2 v. (Madrid 1923-1944) gives the history of the assistency from 1815 to 1868. Thomas Hughes S.J., *History of the Society of Jesus in North America, Colonial and Federal*, 4 vols. (London-New York 1907-1917), deals with the first colonization in 1580 to the suppression in 1773. The text, however, extends well beyond these years to give the background, and the documents continue far into the 19th century. It lists Jesuits in America from 1634 to 1773, but does not study French and Spanish missions. For the North American Assistency the following is also important, G. J. Garaghan S.J., *The Jesuits of the Middle United States* (New York 1938), which deals not only with the mid-western states but gives much information on the Jesuits in all sections of the country; it takes in the period 1823-1923.

The following are the more important for various provinces of the Latin American Assistency. S. Leite S.J., *História da Com-*

- ✓ *panhia de Jesus no Brasil*, 10 vols. (Lisbon-Rio de Janeiro 1938-50); this well nigh exhaustive work deals with the old mission of
- ✓ Brazil. G. Decorme S.J., *La obra de los jesuitas mexicanos en la*
- no *época colonial*, 2 vols. (Mexico 1941); id., *Historia de la C. de J. en la república mexicana durante el siglo XIX*, 2 vols. (Guadalajara 1914-21). F. Enrich S.J., *Historia de la C. de J. en Chile*,
- ✓ 2 vols. (Barcelona 1891); R. Pérez S.J., *La C. de J. en Colombia y Centro América después de su restauración*, 3 vols. (Valladolid
- ✓ 1896-98); id., *La C. de J. restaurada en la república Argentina y Chile, el Uruguay y el Brazil* (Barcelona 1901); P. Hernández
- ? S.J., *La C. de J. en las repúblicas del Sur de América 1836-1914* (Barcelona 1914). *? Chile-Paraguay?*

For the Philippines. F. Colín S.J. (new ed. by P. Pastells S.J.), *Labor evangélica . . . de los obreros de la C. de J . . . en las islas Filipinas*, 3 vols. (Barcelona 1900-1); P. Pastells S.J., *Misión de la C. de J. en Filipinas en el siglo XIX*, 3 vols. (Barcelona 1916-7).

Canada is given the main references in part II; also *Jesuit Relations* in the section of *Documents* in this first part.

Important for the old Society in China is L. Pfister S.J., *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jésuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine*, 2 vols. (Shanghai 1932-34). The first volume takes up the 16th and the 17th centuries; the second the 18th.

Although the Italian Assistency has no general history except that of Tacchi Venturi which embraces only the life time of Ignatius, the various provinces are fairly well prepresented. E. Aguilera S.J. *Provinciae Siculae Societatis ortus et res gestae 1546-1672*, 2 vols. (Palermo 1737-40); A. Leanza S.J., *La C. di G. in Sicilia e il primo secolo del suo rinascimento* (Palermo 1914). This latter is a most thorough and scholarly work on the Order in Sicily with emphasis on 1814-1914. P. Galletti S.J., *Memorie storiche intorno alla Provincia Romana della C. di G. 1814-1914* (Prato 1914); id., *Memorie storiche intorno al P. Luigi Ricasoli e alla C. di G. in Toscana* (Prato 1901). Besides the biography, a general history of the activity of the Order in Tuscany is given in the latter work. The same author has published numerous other works on the history of the Order in Italy. A. Monti S.J.,

✓ *La C. di G. nel territorio della provincia Torinese*, 5 vols. (Chieri 1914-20); F. Schinosi S.J. and S. Santagata S.J., *Istoria della C. di G., appartenente al regno di Napoli*, 4 vols. (Naples 1706-57); G. Cappelletti S.J., *I Gesuiti e la Repubblica di Venezia* (Venice 1873).

Poland's classic account is found in Stanislaus Zalenski S.J., *Jezuici w Polsce*, 11 vols, (Lwów-Cracow). This series deals with the Order from 1555 to 1905; in the appendix to the last volume, there is a brief (34 pp.) Latin summary of the contents of the work); id., *Les Jésuites de la Russie blanche* (French trans. by A. Vivier) 2 vols. (Paris 1886). Most important publication for period of survival.

For Czechoslovakia. A. Kroess S.J., *Geschichte der böhmischen Provinz der Gesellschaft Jesu* (Vienna 1910- 1913) is a scholarly account of the Old Society to 1657.

MISSIONS. Much material is, of course, to be found in the history of the various assistancies and provinces, since the latter often developed from missions and were once dependent upon the former. *Congressus Missionum S.I.* (Rome 1925) is a symposium by experts on the Jesuit Missions throughout the world; printed privately. B. Arens S.J., *Jesuitenorden und Weltmission* (Regensburg, 1937), is an excellent general account of modern foreign missions with extensive bibliography. A. Brou S.J., *Cent ans de Missions 1815-1934* (Paris 1935), is an accurate and more detailed account of Jesuit Missions in the 19th and 20th centuries. Numerous mission periodicals give current information and bibliography on Jesuit Missions; they are indispensable for current history of the various mission areas. The most complete of these is *Nuntii de Missionibus*, published at central headquarters. All Assistencies have their own mission magazines, and even many provinces and missions; thus *Jesuit Missions* (New York) for those dependent upon the American Assistancy; *Missionary Magazine* (London); *Missi* and *Rythmes du Monde* (both Lyons, France), the first popular the second more scholarly, are among the very best in their respective categories. *Studia Missionalia* is a scholarly publication of the Mission faculty of the Gregorian University in Rome. See also bibliography below. Pastor fits missionary activity into the more general framework of Catholic apostolate.

Periodicals. On History. *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* (AHSI) is a scholarly publication devoted exclusively to the scientific investigation of the history of the Order. It publishes each year a well-nigh exhaustive bibliography of publications on the Order. It is issued at central headquarters (Borgo S. Spirito 5, Rome). *Mid-America*, published in Chicago by the Institute of Jesuit History is an important review in this field. *The Historical Bulletin* (St. Louis) is a general historical publication with scat-

- ✓ tered articles on Jesuit history. *Monumenta Nipponica* is important for oriental history of the Order (Tokyo). *Acta Apostolicae*
- ✓ *Sedis* (Rome-Vatican City) is the official commentary of the Holy See; it contains important documents concerning the current and past (beatifications, canonizations) of the Order. Printed pri-
- ✓ vately (in Rome) by the Order are *Acta Romana* (more im-
- ✓ portant official current documents) and *Memorabilia Societatis Iesu*, a general news bulletin. Since the history of the Order is closely related to the various phases of its ministry, publications in the more important fields deserve mention here, especially as they contain numerous articles on Jesuit history. General Culture: *Stimmen der Zeit* (since October 1914, formerly *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, Freiburg); *Streven* (since 1947 united with *Katholiek*, Antwerp); *Studies* (Dublin); *Revista Javeriana* (Bogotá, Colombia); *Latinoamérica* (Mexico City, but embraces culture of all Latin American countries, Brazil included; articles
- ✓ in Spanish and Portuguese); *America* (New York); *Thought* (New York) of a more scholarly nature with important articles
- ✓ on Jesuit History. Social Questions: *Social Order* (St. Louis), since January 1951 for general public; 1948-50 published pri-
- ✓ vately, as also predecessor, *ISO Bulletin*; *Catholic Social Guild Bulletin* (Oxford); *Relations* and numerous other publications of the *Ecole Sociale Populaire* (Montreal); *Dossiers de l'Action Populaire* and *Cahiers d'Action Religieuse et Sociale* (Paris); *Fomento Social* (Madrid). Though of a general culture nature, the two following contain far more numerous and important articles
- ✓ on Jesuit History: *Razón y Fe* (Madrid) and *Civiltà Cattolica*
- ✓ (Rome). *Woodstock Letters*, a private publication, is of vital importance for the history of the Order in America (Woodstock, Maryland).

Bibliography of the Order: *Moniteur bibliographique de la Compagnie de Jésus*, begun in Paris in 1889, continues to 1915

✓ (Paris 1921). The *Index Bibliographicus* by J. Juambelz S.J. is meant to continue the *Moniteur*; published thus far are the years 1937-39 (Rome). The most complete current bibliography of the

✓ history of the Order is found in the *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* (Rome); this review is edited in the principal modern

✓ languages and Latin. The *Bibliothèque des Ecrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus* by A. De Backer S.J. and C. Sommervogel S.J. (new edition 11 vols. [Paris 1890-1932] contains last two volumes by P. Bliard S.J.) with supplements by E. Riviere S.J. and

F. Cavallera S.J. (Toulouse 1911-30) is the most complete general bibliography of the writers of the Order and supplants the many previous compilations, too numerous to attempt to catalog in this short list. The *Bibliothèque* gives a brief biographical notice of each writer listed. The first part (10 vols.) catalogs works *by* Jesuits; the second part (fragmentary) lists works *about* Jesuits. For a general idea of the contents of the *Bibliothèque*, see vol. X, under "Table générale méthodique de la B., tomes I a X." (Theology, col. 1ss.; Jurisprudence, col. 683ss.; The Sciences and Arts, col. 715ss.; Belles-Lettres, col. 941ss.; Geography and History, col. 1385ss. [Jesuits: col. 1417B ss.].) For the Old Spanish Assistancy: E. de Uriarte S.J. *Catálogo razonado* . . . 5 vols. (Madrid 1904-16) and Uriarte S.J. and Lecina, *Biblioteca de escritores de la C. de J.*, 2 vols. thus far (Madrid 1925-30); this latter collection is being continued by M. Batllori S.J. Important for the missions is P. Streit O.M.I. and A. Dindinger O.M.I., *Bibliotheca Missionum* (Münster-Aachen-Freiburg 1916—).

Collection of documents: *Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu* (MHSI) begun in Madrid in 1894 is being continued in Rome; to date (end of 1951) 73 volumes have been published. It contains the writings of Ignatius and his companions; a section dealing with the missions has been started. For an expert account of this most important collection of Jesuit documents, see *Archivum Historicum* S.I. for 1944 (volume 13) pp. 1-61. The MHSI is published by the Institutum Historicum S.I. in Rome, which likewise publishes the AHSI. *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. Travels and Explorations of the French Missionaries among the Indians of Canada and the Northern and Northwestern States of the U.S. 1610-1791.* (Cleveland 1897-1901) This important collection for North American history contains the original French, Latin or Italian with an English translation. O. Braunsberger S.J., *B. Petri Canisii, S.J. Epistolae et Acta*, 8 vols. (Freiburg 1896-1923.) "Cette collection d'une technique impeccable est notre principale publication de sources a coté des MHSI. Elle est fort importante pour l'histoire de la première génération de la Compagnie dans les pays du nord de l'Europe." (Lamalle, o.c., p. 19). A. Carayon S.J., *Documents inédits concernant la C. de J.*, 24 parts in 14 vols. (Poitiers 1863-1886). Deals with France, from earliest apostolate to latter part of 17th century; parts often quoted under own titles.

- ✓ General reference works: *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York 1907-14; 15 vols. with Index vol.: supplements: 1923 and latest in printing); *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris 1903—) is most important for doctrinal part of Jesuit history (for example Jansenism, Modernism); *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire* (Paris 1932);
- ✓ *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada* (Espasa) 70 vols. with some 20 supplementary vols. to date (Barcelona, n.d.) has a vast amount of information regarding the Order; uneven in treatment.
- ✓ M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche* (Paderborn 1934), 3rd enlarged edition, II vol. pp. 130-340 deal with the Jesuit Order; copious and systematic bibliography.
- ✓ *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg 1930-38).

Hagiography: see Saints under part II. E. de Guilhaemy, S.J.,

- ✓ *Ménologe de la C. de J.*, 14 vols. (Paris 1867-1904). Guilhaemy began the series, J. Terrier, S.J., continued it. "Les notices sont courtes, mais généralement faites avec soin; on y relève rarement des inexactitudes." (Lamalle, o.c., p. 24).

- ✓ The best set of maps is found in L. Carrez S.J., *Atlas Geographicus Societatis Jesu* (Paris 1900). This is more than an ordinary atlas; it gives much history of the Order along with each map. Carrez drew upon the best sources, both cartographical as well as historical with the result that this work is one of the best tools for the history teacher. Unfortunately, this important compilation needs to be brought up to date.

- ✓ For the Papacy and the Jesuits, there are several important works. L. von Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste* (Freiburg, numerous editions) from volume V to XVI,3 inclusively, that is from the foundation of the Order to its suppression. J. Schmidlin,
- ✓ *Papstgeschichte der neuesten Zeit*, 4 vols. (Munich 1933-1939); vol. I is the pontificate of Pius VII, Leo XII, Pius VIII and Gregory XVI; vol. II, Pius IX and Leo XIII; vol. III, Pius X and Benedict XV; vol. IV, Pius XI. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* and *Acta Romana* publish important pontifical documents, some of these appear in *Osservatore Romano*.

Helpful in tracking down legends and calumnies against the Order are: A. Brou S.J., *Les Jésuites de la Légende*, 2 vols. (Paris 1906-7); B. Duhr S.J., *Jesuiten-Fabeln*, 4 ed. (Freiburg 1904).

THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO LIBERTY

As Recognized by the San Francisco Bay Area Press
Fifty Years Ago

ASHBROOK LINCOLN*

The years 1903 to 1905 were part of the "Era of the Muck-rakers" in which American journalists tried to awaken the public to the existing political corruption and business malpractices. Writers, by the criticism and exposure of these evils, sought to strengthen the fundamental bases of American democracy and to recover equality of opportunity. The critical attitude prevalent regarding the weak spots of America's own democratic process of government was used by the San Francisco bay area press in the examination of the Russian governmental institutions and practices.

The Czar's autocracy frequently was evaluated and compared to the American democracy. Russian leaders were denounced in almost exactly the same terms as today. Protests were made then by the editors against the Czar's treatment of his subject races—Finns, Poles, and Jews, in much the same manner as they are made now against the Soviet's treatment of her satellite nations.

Then, as today, Russian diplomatic practices and imperialistic aims were examined and condemned as menaces to democracy everywhere. Muscovite expansion into East Asia was regarded as part of Russia's attempt to become "mistress of the world." The very phrases used recently, "the red peril," "the curtain," "the iron hand of Russia," "policy of peaceful penetration," "the Ananias of nations," "violation of international pledges," were used to describe Russia nearly fifty years ago.

In comparing the United States and Russia it was noted that the cornerstones of the American democracy were liberty, equality and the dominion of law. The cornerstones of the Russian Empire, on the other hand, were autocratic will and brute force.¹ The San Francisco bay region editors recalled that for years the Czar's autocrats had been endeavoring to extinguish the very political doctrine on which the American Republic was founded—namely, government for the benefit of the governed, not for the benefit of the rulers. Sovereignty, Czar Nicholas II believed,

*Mr. Lincoln received his doctorate from the University of California, at present he is assistant professor of history at the University of San Francisco.

¹ *Sacramento Union*, July 7, and Nov. 13, 1903.

rested not with the people but with a hereditary line of emperors.²

Nicholas II was a favorite subject for editorial invective. He was condemned as the puny "descendant of vice, murder, and tyranny";³ "weak and vacillating as Louis XVI and as false and treacherous as Charles I";⁴ "a bigoted incompetent totally ignorant of and indifferent to the needs of his people."⁵ The *Sacramento Union* observed that an "occasional lifting of the curtain. . . shows . . . the fact that the Czar is many times too small for his job."⁶

The bay area newspapers also charged that he was a mere tool of a clique of selfish and irresponsible advisors.⁷ These rascally Grand Dukes and unscrupulous court parasites took it for granted that the common people were created to serve them.⁸ These evil counselors were branded as the most "dissolute, debauched, and corrupt wretches seen in Europe since the Court of Louis XIV."⁹

The Russian autocracy was attacked repeatedly as the most cruel and despotic in the world. The *Call* described it as the "most criminal and oppressive government that exists." It was a "brutal autocracy" that knew only "cruelty, the most reckless and inhuman, as the means of controlling its people."¹⁰ The *Call* observed that when students and teachers assembled in protest against the conditions, savage Cossacks rode them down, cut open the faces of girls with whips and killed all sexes and ages without discrimination. Many were exiled to Siberia for life for remarks regarded as insults to the Czar.¹¹ No cruelty was too severe to preserve the interest of the autocracy.¹² The *San Francisco Examiner* found the Russian government to be a "disgracefully tyrannical system of slavery secretly executing at night hundreds of agitators who demand a just government."¹³ This was not new and unusual in Russia, said the Hearst paper. Throughout history the chief characteristic of Muscovite growth

² S.F. *Bulletin*, Feb. 25, 1905.

³ S.F. *Examiner*, April 21, 1905; S.F. *Evening Post*, Jan. 23, 1905.

⁴ *Oakland Tribune*, Oct. 31, 1905.

⁵ S.F. *Chronicle*, June 21, 1905, and Nov. 2, 1904.

⁶ *Sacramento Union*, Aug. 2, 1904, see also Jan. 25, 1905 and May 18, 1905.

⁷ S.F. *Examiner*, Feb. 23, April 21, Dec. 14, 1905.

⁸ S.F. *Bulletin*, Aug. 19, 1905.

⁹ S.F. *Call*, Feb. 1903.

¹⁰ S.F. *Call*, March 18, July 16, 1904.

¹¹ S.F. *Call*, Dec. 31, 1903, Feb. 2 and Feb. 16, 1904.

¹² *Sacramento Union*, Jan. 24, 1905.

¹³ S.F. *Examiner*, July 6, 1904.

had been murder—"murder on the throne, rulers slaughtering each other and even their own children, wholesale murder in Siberia, where thousands of Russian men and women perish miserably because they [spoke] for liberty."¹⁴ The *Oakland Tribune* charged that the Czar's autocracy was one of greed, oppression and medieval despotism. It crucified civil and religious liberty while giving the "governed a government so evil in purpose and so corrupt in application as to constitute a crime against civilization."¹⁵

The condition of Russia's subject peoples was a question of grave concern to the California press. Numerous editorials explained the Czar's control before and after the policy of Russification was adopted. It was pointed out that at the time of their conquest in 1809 by Alexander I, the Finns were left practically to govern themselves with only a personal union through the Czar. Finland was to have religious toleration. She was to have her own military system and power to enact her own laws by her own officials. As long as this arrangement was retained, the press believed the Finns were "prosperous and happy."¹⁶

After 1899, in disregard for treaty commitments and in an avowed effort to destroy Finnish national sentiment, a policy of Russification by force was inaugurated. One by one the Finnish people were stripped of their ancient privileges. Russians supplanted Finns as administrative officials and judges. Finnish laws and constitutional government gradually were suspended. The Diet of the Grand Duchy was refused permission to meet. Powers of the Senate were transferred to the Russian appointed Governor-General. Freedoms of speech, press, and assembly were abolished arbitrarily. A system of espionage, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment was substituted. Russian police and soldiers were sent to enforce this repressive policy. To appeal for protection against lawless despotism was treated as a crime. Thousands of Finns were imprisoned or sent to Siberia. The independent Finnish army was abolished and replaced by the Russian Military system. Finns were conscripted into the Muscovite army.

In order to destroy the Finnish language, Russian was made the official language of the Grand Duchy. Only Russian could be

¹⁴ *S.F. Examiner*, May 24, 1903.

¹⁵ *Oakland Tribune*, Nov. 24, 1904.

¹⁶ *Sacramento Union*, June 19, 1904.

used in schools, courts, and the Finnish Senate. It became unlawful to possess national literary treasures and to sing national songs. Finns could not even meet for religious and social purposes—except by military permission and under military observation. The religious persecution begun by the Russian Holy Synod ended religious toleration and forbade many sacred Finnish religious practices.¹⁷

Russification of Finland was attacked continually in the bay area press. The *Oakland Tribune* called it a "suppression of social habits, customs, laws, language and social instincts as has not been attempted anywhere [during the last] 500 years."¹⁸ The *Sacramento Union* denounced the program as a "barbaric system of cruelty" enforced by the "ruthless practices of the Middle Ages."¹⁹ To the *San Francisco Cal!* it was a "despicable policy" which had changed a "contented and prosperous population [into] a forlorn herd of slaves."²⁰

Northern California editors also denounced the "cruel and cowardly despoilation" of Poland.²¹ This Duchy had been promised its own constitution, its own flag and the use of its own language. It was to have a representative government with its own minister and its own two-house legislature. Guarantees were given of personal liberty and freedom of the press. But after the insurrection of 1863 every vestige of the kingdom of Poland was swept aside. In order to crush Polish nationalism, a policy of Russification was inaugurated. Only Russian was to be taught in schools and universities. All local government, religious toleration, and civil liberties were replaced by the iron hand of Russia.²² This policy led the *Sacramento Union* to note that "every page of Poland's history that bears the name of Russia bears also the smear of blood."²³

The history of Russian policy in regard to the Baltic provinces was very much the same as that toward Finland and Poland. The *Tribune* pointed out that as long as the Baltic peoples were "per-

¹⁷ *Oakland Tribune*, June 28, July 17 and Aug. 16, 1904; *S.F. Call*, Aug. 2, 1903, June 10, 1904; *S.F. Chronicle*, June 18, July 11, 1904; *Sacramento Union*, July 19, 1904, Sept. 25, 1905.

¹⁸ *Oakland Tribune*, Nov. 10, 1903.

¹⁹ *Sacramento Union*, July 19 and Sept. 25, 1905.

²⁰ *S.F. Call*, July 16 and Dec. 28, 1904.

²¹ *S.F. Evening Post*, March 11, 1904.

²² *S.F. Chronicle*, Jan. 10, 1905.

²³ *Sacramento Union*, June 25, 1905.

mitted to retain their own laws and institutions and were given a reasonable latitude for industrial and commercial development, they prospered and were fairly content under the rule of the Czar." Then a policy of Russification was begun. One by one the Baltic peoples mercilessly were deprived of their ancient liberties. "Year by year the hand of the Czar weighed more heavily on their commerce, racial and religious sentiments."²⁴

The Czar's treatment of his Jewish subjects aroused far more indignation among San Francisco editors. "Bad and repressive as Russian autocracy is throughout the empire, its malignant quintessence of oppression and diabolism is apparent within the Jewish pale," reported the *San Francisco Call*.²⁵ Other papers agreed that it was a policy of "fiendish" and "deliberate oppression."

The denunciation of Russia reached its peak after the pogrom at Kishineff in Southwestern Russia. On Easter Sunday, April 20, 1903, and for several succeeding days, Jewish homes and stores were destroyed. Brutal attacks were made by Russian mobs on defenseless men, women, and children. The wave of horror was discussed by the California press for several weeks.

On May 11, 1903, the *Examiner* began a series of spectacular descriptions. "RUSSIA SPARED NOT JEWISH WOMAN OR CHILD" was the first of a number of headlines. The massacre was ranked with that of Saint Bartholomew's Day in France. "For three days in Kishineff . . . there was a carnival of fanatical bloodshedding, of barbarous cruelty and recklessness that spared neither the aged, the women nor the children in arms." The Hearst paper reported that as many as 300 had been killed and that "The atrocities [were] almost unparalleled in the history of religious or race bigotry."²⁶ Several days later the *Examiner* headlines announced: "RUSSIAN POLICE ORDER SLAYING OF JEWISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN." Most of the second page was devoted to the pogrom. It contained eye-witness accounts from prominent Jewish leaders and others denouncing *Russian action*.²⁷ On May 20, the entire upper half of the front page was devoted to an editorial signed by William Randolph Hearst. He appealed for funds to be sent to relieve Jewish suffering. During the next few

²⁴ *Oakland Tribune*, Dec. 14, 1905.

²⁵ *S.F. Call*, May 28, 1903.

²⁶ *S.F. Examiner*, May 11 and 12, 1903.

²⁷ *S.F. Examiner*, May 17 and 18, 1903.

days, full page editorials declared that it was the moral duty of the United States to protest to Russia against these "hideous crimes" and "fiendish outrages."²⁸ A three-quarter page cartoon showed a bearded, booted Russian, whip in one hand, and a helpless baby in the other. Men, women, and children, were being beaten in the background. The Russian nation, the editorial declared was a "great mass of half-assimilated savagery. It rules tens of millions savage creatures, rules in a savage way on a savage basis."²⁹

Meanwhile, other newspapers had joined in the campaign of denunciation. The *Call* released the story of the pogrom on May 16 with a front page drawing of a Russian soldier clubbing men, women and children. The next day its headline announced: "BLACKEST DEEDS IN NERO'S TIME LESS FRIGHTFUL THAN THE KISHINEFF ATROCITIES." The despatch vividly described the details of the massacre—arms, legs, ears, noses cut off; tongues and windpipes plucked out; bodies of children torn in two; women nailed to the floor. In editorials, the *Call* branded the pogrom a "fiendish and deliberate" attempt to dehumanize the Jews. "The great purpose of Russian laws is the extermination of Jews by disease and starvation. The murderous mobs merely accelerated this a little, and effect the purpose of the government by quicker means."³⁰ The *Chronicle* compared the atrocities with those of the Middle Ages when men and women were burned at the stake or drawn and quartered on account of their faith. The government which failed to prevent such massacres was unworthy of recognition as a civilized government.³¹ The *Tribune* felt "nothing the Boxers in China did was more hideous and inhuman."³² To the San Francisco *Evening Post*, the outrages were "a disgrace to the century we live in."³³

The demands of the Hearst press that the United States protest in the name of modern civilization brought no such drastic action by the State Department. Since no American citizens were affected, the Roosevelt administration announced it had no more right to protest than Russia would have to protest lynching of

²⁸ S.F. *Examiner*, May 18-24, 1903.

²⁹ S.F. *Examiner*, May 24, 1903.

³⁰ S.F. *Call*, May 26, 27 and 28, 1903.

³¹ S.F. *Chronicle*, May 18, 1903.

³² Oakland *Tribune*, May 18, 1903.

³³ S.F. *Evening Post*, May 22, 1903.

negroes in the South.³⁴ The publicity given to the Kisheneff massacre was one of the principal factors in causing the bay area press to become fiercely anti-Russian after May, 1903.

Russian diplomatic practices in Asia were denounced as a series of the "grossest deceptions ever practiced in diplomacy."³⁵ They were accused of lying, cheating, stealing, swindling, and corrupting. The *Oakland Tribune* noted that "promises, compacts and treaty obligations will not weigh a hair against her fixed determination."³⁶ To the *Call*, the Czar's diplomacy was "not redeemed by a single truth or the keeping of a single promise." Every step of the "Ananias of nations" was marked by a volume of deceptions, broken faiths and duplicities.³⁷

The Russian advance across all Asia into Manchuria was described as a series of "peaceful penetrations" into the territory of her neighbors. Russia, it was said, always pretended to be a friend of the weaker state which she aimed to annex. Then she would "advance with sugar in one hand and sword in the other."³⁸ Having obtained an opening by a polar bear hug, and by promises of material aid and protection, the bear gradually and unscrupulously would absorb the area. If resistance arose, it would be treated as an act of aggression and would be suppressed by every cruelty that her Cossacks could inflict.³⁹

If this "conquest without war" met with pressure from other powers, Russian diplomacy was artful and elastic. She would make a series of demands on the area to be annexed. If other nations would oppose the Russian action, she would compromise and gain some of her requests. Then the Czar would wait for the opportune moment and make further demands. Outside protests would be met with promises. Fulfillment of the promises would be postponed continually until those protesting were so weary they ceased to complain. By then Russia would have secured her original demands.⁴⁰ The *Evening Post* noted the Russians had a "thorough dislike for acquisition by violence in the open when matters can be arranged in the dark."⁴¹

³⁴ S.F. *Call*, July 4, 16, 17 and 18, 1903.

³⁵ S.F. *Call*, June 30, 1903.

³⁶ *Oakland Tribune*, April 25, 1903.

³⁷ S.F. *Call*, May 20, June 30, July 9, Oct. 14, 1903.

³⁸ S.F. *Evening Post*, March 8, 1904; S.F. *Bulletin*, Feb. 9, 1904.

³⁹ S.F. *Call*, March 19, 1904.

⁴⁰ S.F. *Call*, Nov. 13, 1903.

⁴¹ S.F. *Evening Post*, Feb. 19, 1904.

The advance into Manchuria was described as part of the Russian plan: first, to conquer China; then India, Persia, and all Asia. The press feared the "Muscovite menace" had even more grandiose ideas which would not stop at control of one coast of the Pacific, but would continue until Russia became "Mistress of the world."⁴² The *Call* predicted that if the Muscovites once gained mastery of the five hundred million people of East Asia, they would control the world and "centuries to come would see no peace except in the same slavery that Napoleon forced upon continental Europe."⁴³ The *Oakland Tribune* comment was strikingly similar to many published today:

Russian policy is the most cruel and despotic in the world. It is not only destroying the independence of other nations but is seeking to crush out race sentiment and race identity. . . . Wherever the iron hand of Russia reaches free government, free speech, free thought and free exercise of property and personal rights are strangled . . . [She is] the destroyer of liberty and the oppressor of mankind.⁴⁴

The San Francisco *Examiner* agreed: "enslaving where she goes, Russia is a menace to human liberty" and "free institutions everywhere." Her ambition, said the Hearst paper, was like that of Alexander and Napoleon—it was "control of the earth." Russia was called the "Red Peril" since an aggressive war might be declared "at any moment by the insanely irresponsible Czar."⁴⁵

The *Oakland Tribune* called the Czar's tactics "diplomacy with a bludgeon" since it was "distinguished by savage and indiscriminate butcheries" of men, women, and children.⁴⁶ The *Call* branded the Muscovites "the most ignorant, degraded and brutal troops that ever wore the uniform of a civilized nation." Their actions were distinguished by bestiality of the lowest order; their conduct was "so abhorrent that cannot be characterized." "No four-footed thing, no reptile that crawls crookedly, and no bird of prey that flies in the air was ever guilty of the atrocities of the Russian soldiery."⁴⁷

⁴² San Jose *Herald*, Feb. 17, 1904; S.F. *Examiner*, Feb. 23, 1904; S.F. *Call*, Feb. 18, 1904.

⁴³ S.F. *Call*, Sept. 25, 1904.

⁴⁴ *Oakland Tribune*, Feb. 17, 1904.

⁴⁵ S.F. *Examiner*, March 3 and July 6, 1904.

⁴⁶ *Oakland Tribune*, May 13, June 30, July 7 and 16, 1903.

⁴⁷ S.F. *Call*, Jan. 13, Feb. 12 and Feb. 18, 1904.

Being convinced that the grasping bear intended to stay in Manchuria and feeling that its steps into Korea endangered her national security and ambitions, Japan opened direct negotiations with Russia. Met by Russian evasion, duplicity, exasperating delays, and arrogance, she took a decisive step. On February 8, 1904, without a declaration of war, the Imperial Fleet made a surprise attack on Port Arthur.

Russia's complaint that Japan had "stabbed her in the back" by the sneak attack on Port Arthur—a blow often compared to a similar attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941—aroused no sympathy in the San Francisco bay region press. The *Sacramento Union* and the *San Francisco Call* believed the attack thoroughly justified. The *Evening Post*, while congratulating the Japanese on their "masterly stroke," was less complimentary to the Czar's forces:

The showing made by the Russians is, from a military standpoint, disgraceful. The mere fact that they were caught napping when war had been menacing them for weeks is enough to bring her commander-in-chief and the captains of her vessels before a court-martial for gross neglect of duty. Such carelessness and incompetency are military enormities, for which the death sentence would be none too severe. . . . The more the details of the Japanese tactics are scrutinized the more admirable they seem.⁴⁸

All bay area editors agreed that a Japanese victory would benefit civilization and that the brutal bear deserved a licking. To the *Call*, Japan was "standing as the avenger of the nations that have been deceived, lied to, and victimized by Muscovite trickery and deception." Nippon was battling the "design of the Czar to make future civilization conform to the Cossack model and to put his foot on the neck of the world."⁴⁹ To the *Sacramento Union*, the armies of Japan were "not only the champions of the cause of outraged China, but also of Finland, of Poland and of Judaism."⁵⁰ The *Tribune* was sure the Russian people would benefit by the defeat of the Czar.⁵¹ The *Examiner* felt it would not only be a great victory for the real people of Russia, but it would also be a "glorious thing" for the world.⁵²

⁴⁸ S.F. *Evening Post*, Feb. 10 and 12, 1904.

⁴⁹ S.F. *Call*, July 19, Oct. 4, 20, 1903, and Jan. 23, Feb. 16, May 4, 1904.

⁵⁰ *Sacramento Union*, Sept. 17, 1905.

⁵¹ *Oakland Tribune*, Nov. 24, 1904, March 11 and June 2, 1905.

⁵² S.F. *Examiner*, Jan. 9, 15, July 16, 1904 and April 21, 1905.

As Russia suffered one overwhelming defeat after another on land and on sea, the press became more and more critical of the Czar and his incompetent and corrupt advisors. The San Francisco *Examiner* insisted that the war had been caused and continued by the Russian Grand Dukes who were "half-civilized beasts," "unspeakably low and ignorant." The Japanese, the Hearst paper stressed, "are defeating—not the Russian people—but a collection of degraded, dissipated, vicious, cowardly and decayed would-be autocrats."⁵³

In November and December, 1904, the Russian autocracy seemed ready to take a step toward popular government. Representatives of local *zemstvos* and municipal *doumas* were allowed to meet in a national congress. They petitioned Nicholas II to reform the political system by guaranteeing free speech, free press, freedom of association, equal civil rights, extension of local self-government and the establishment of a national parliament. The Czar was reported to be in favor of making concessions. The editors were optimistic. The San Francisco *Chronicle* called it the "Dawn of a New Era in Russia." It was hoped that it would be "the entering wedge to the establishment of a constitutional government in Russia." "The war would be a blessing in disguise since it [might] mean the end of Russian bureaucracy."⁵⁴

An Imperial *ukase* on December 26, 1904, announced some desirable reforms for the peasants and local *zemstvos*, but said nothing about either a constitution or a national parliament. The "divinely appointed" autocracy was to be maintained unimpaired. It was hinted the reforms requested were unnecessary, if not treasonable. The demand for the right of free discussion of public policies was regarded as seditious.⁵⁵ The *Chronicle* was now less enthusiastic. The Czar's decree conceded "absolutely nothing" because the people were not granted any voice in policy formation or even allowed organized expression of opinion upon national policies.⁵⁶ The Czar's action did not change the political situation in Russia, insisted the San Francisco *Call*. Russia was "further back than England was before [the] Magna Charta." Russia was where it was when "Peter the Great whipped his own son to death and Paul murdered his heir." "The intelligent and

⁵³ S.F. *Examiner*, April 21, 1905.

⁵⁴ S.F. *Chronicle*, Dec. 10 and 16, 1904.

⁵⁵ S.F. *Call*, Dec. 28 and 29, 1904; S.F. *Chronicle*, Dec. 29, 1904.

⁵⁶ S.F. *Chronicle*, Dec. 28, 1904.

aspiring people of Russia have no recourse except the violent overthrow of a vicious system." The *ukase* "does not mitigate nor soften the rule of the Grand Dukes, nor lift a feather's weight of the load that is imposed upon the freedom of thought and action in that empire . . . The Grand Dukes seem to have merely put off the day of reckoning by providing that the score will be larger when the settlement comes."⁵⁷

The spirit of liberty was awake in Russia and was not to be chained or lulled to sleep. Russian liberals in political banquets and provocative speeches became bolder. Students of several universities and the industrial workingmen joined the *zemstvos* and professional classes. The agitation became economic as well as political. Strikes were held in Moscow, Vilna, and other industrial centers. The news of the surrender of Port Arthur, on January 1, 1905, to the Japanese further discredited the government and aided the spread of discontent to all parts of the empire.

In the early days of 1905, St. Petersburg was paralyzed by a strike which involved over 100,000 men. The workers were confident if only they could reach the ear of the "Little Father," he would hear their complaints and remedy the evils in Russia. A petition was drafted demanding moderate economic and political reforms. It was a plea for humane treatment and just dealing at the hands of officials. It also requested the election of a constituent assembly to introduce a representative government.⁵⁸

On Sunday, January 22, 1905, Father Gapon in golden vestments led a procession of thousands of men, women and children. They carried icons and sang religious and patriotic songs. Although the priest and his followers gave no indication of desire to provoke disorder or to start a revolt, they were fired upon by the military as they approached the palace. "Bloody Sunday" resulted. At other points in the city conflicts between the troops and the people culminated in bloody massacres.

Vivid narratives of the massacres, imaginative sketches of the streets of St. Petersburg, and lengthy editorials described "Bloody Sunday" to bay area readers. The *Chronicle* ran the headline "TROOPS SLAY TWO THOUSAND AND WOUND FIVE THOUSAND IN ST. PETERSBURG STREETS" and devoted four full pages to the event.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ S.F. *Call*, Dec. 29, 1904.

⁵⁸ S.F. *Chronicle*, Jan. 23, 1905; S.F. *Call*, Jan. 23, 1905.

⁵⁹ S.F. *Chronicle*, Jan. 23, 1905

The Oakland *Tribune* used the occasion to deliver a political sermon:

Out of blood and darkness will in time come freedom and the light. Every popular revolution reddens the sky with burning cities and crimson the soil with innocent blood. Liberty is born in woe and suffering; it is baptized in the life current of its progenitors and it is fructified by the lives laid down that it may survive.⁶⁰

The San Francisco *Call* predicted "Bloody Sunday" would remove the bandages from the eyes of the Russian people. Czar Nicholas II would no longer be regarded as the "Little Father." The Grand Dukes would no longer dazzle the common people into blind adoration. Temporarily, the lack of leadership might prevent the seething maelstrom from crystallizing into a revolution. But when a second Danton or Murat appeared, as he inevitably would, the overthrow of the Romanoffs and the establishment of free government would be achieved.⁶¹

It was generally agreed that the consequences of "Bloody Sunday" would be "momentous" and "far-reaching." The medieval despotism was playing its last card. The Sacramento *Union* forecast the day of reckoning for the blind and stubborn autocracy would soon arrive.⁶²

"Bloody Sunday" was the spark that caused revolutionary flames to spread like wildfire throughout the Czar's domains. An epidemic of strikes spread to almost every trade and profession. The strikes in the cities sent thousands of workmen filled with revolutionary ideas back to their villages. Bands of peasants began to wander about pillaging and burning the mansions of noble landlords. The University of St. Petersburg and many other Russian universities, gymnasia, and grammar schools struck. In Poland, the Caucasus, Finland, and the Baltic provinces, the subject nationalities rioted and threatened to revolt.⁶³

In February, Grand Duke Sergius, uncle of the Czar, was driving within the walls of the Kremlin when he was murdered by an assassin who threw a bomb under his carriage. The Duke's family received no sympathy from the bay region press. The San Jose *Herald* called the assassination "another incident in the movement of the Russian people toward the goal of liberty."

⁶⁰ Oakland *Tribune*, Jan. 23 and 25, 1905.

⁶¹ S.F. *Call*, Jan. 29, 1905.

⁶² Sacramento *Union*, Jan. 24, 1905.

⁶³ S.F. *Chronicle*, Feb. 8, 11, 25, 1905.

Crimes of this type were necessary to awaken the "Little Father" and his incapable and brutal bureaucrats who seemed to be open to no other type of argument.⁶⁴

In March when news of the overwhelming Japanese victory in the bloody battle of Mukden was heard west of the Urals, the troubles of the Romanoff dynasty multiplied. Industrial strikes became bolder and fiercer. Almost daily there was rioting and bomb throwing. In the South, peasant populations rose in revolt. In some areas, homes of the landed aristocracy were set afire, often their occupants murdered. Peasants began to divide the landed estates among themselves. The police and the military seemed unable to crush revolts in Poland, Finland, Crimea and the Caucasus.⁶⁵

Standing precariously between two fires—one which was destroying its power and prestige in the Far East, and the other menacing the oligarchy at home—the Czar slowly and falteringly made a few concessions. The right of petition was granted. There was to be a representative assembly. The people were to be allowed to participate in a consultative capacity in consideration of projected reforms and preparation of legislation.⁶⁶ On Easter Sunday, April 30, 1905, Nicholas promised religious toleration. In Poland and Lithuania, the native languages could be used in private schools. Anti-Jewish legislation was to be less strictly enforced.

California editors were not impressed by the Czar's concessions. The San Francisco *Evening Post's* comment was typical. The "great gift" of the "Little Father" was "a sop to the many-headed dog at the gates." The grant of religious toleration was limited and it was a temporizing measure in lieu of granting political liberty. "The people have asked for bread and the Government has given them an unconsecrated wafer."⁶⁷ The *Tribune* observed that the Romanoffs still used the Cossacks to flog students and citizens assembling in the streets and that secret police still sent others to the mines of Siberia.⁶⁸ The *Call* charged that the Jews in Bessarabia were still "denied rights that men elsewhere freely give to four-footed beasts."⁶⁹

⁶⁴ San Jose *Herald*, Feb. 18, 1905.

⁶⁵ S.F. *Chronicle*, March 27, 28, 29 and 30, 1905.

⁶⁶ S.F. *Examiner*, March 4, 1905.

⁶⁷ S.F. *Evening Post*, May 1, 1905.

⁶⁸ Oakland *Tribune*, June 2, 1905.

⁶⁹ S.F. *Call*, June 30, 1905.

During the last few days of May, 1905, Admiral Rozhdestvenshy's Baltic Fleet virtually was annihilated by Admiral Togo in the Straits of Tsushima. Flames of revolution flared up into a mighty conflagration. By the end of June a reign of anarchy prevailed throughout Russia. Striking workingmen in Odessa, Lodz, Libau, Cronstadt, Warsaw and elsewhere threw up street barricades, raided government warehouses, set afire several naval vessels. Soldiers and sailors mutinied and joined the revolutionary workers behind the barricades. The sailors on the battleship *Potemkine* murdered their officers at sea and threw their bodies overboard.⁷⁰

On August 19, 1905, Nicholas II made another concession. An imperial decree promised a parliament for Russia. It was to have power to suggest and discuss laws, but no power to enact or make them effective. It could examine the budget, but could not amend it or vote appropriations. The *Call* was not impressed. The *douma* would be ineffective since *douma* delegates, like territorial delegates, in the United States House of Representatives, could not vote. They could only debate. The decree did not give a single assurance of civil rights. None of the freedoms guaranteed to English-speaking peoples in their Bill of Rights were granted.⁷¹ The *Sacramento Union* sneered that the *douma* was a "fraud and a delusion," which would "do no more for Russia than a piece of candy would do for a starving man. It is not a representative assembly, not a parliament,—in fact, a mere name given to a mere nothing."⁷²

Overwhelmingly defeated by Japan on land and sea, and faced with a rapidly spreading revolution at home, Russia belatedly agreed to accept the mediation of President Theodore Roosevelt. Negotiations began with the Japanese at Portsmouth, N.H., late in August. Because Roosevelt believed the Czar's diplomatic practices were "treacherous," "insincere" and "untrustworthy" he feared for the success of his efforts.⁷³ In spite of the President's apprehension, and largely because of his strenuous efforts, a

⁷⁰ S.F. *Call*, June 29 and 30, 1905.

⁷¹ S.F. *Call*, Aug. 20, 1905.

⁷² *Sacramento Union*, Oct. 17, 1905.

⁷³ Roosevelt to Lodge, June 5 and 16, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1908*, II, pp. 134 and 152.

treaty of peace was signed between Russia and Japan on September 5, 1905.

During the last two weeks of October a bloody general strike swept over Russia. Railroads, telegraph and postal service stopped. Electricity and water were turned off. Newspapers were not published. Shops were closed; windows were boarded and barred. Industrial and commercial life came to a standstill. Many towns had serious food shortages. Violence spread again. There were reports that soldiers mutinied when ordered to fire upon crowds. Even the imperial guard and the brutal Cossacks seemed disposed to join the revolt.⁷⁴

"His empire rocked like a frail craft in a storm . . . the supplies of his table cut off by a general blockade," Nicholas wavered again.⁷⁵ On October 30, 1905, the "autocrat of all the Russias" yielded. Headlines announced his actions to San Francisco newspaper readers:

CZAR GRANTS LIBERTY TO THE RUSSIANS⁷⁶

CZAR ENDS AUTOCRACY AND GRANTS LIBERTY UNDER A CONSTITUTION⁷⁷

RULE OF ABSOLUTISM GIVES WAY TO MODERN FORM OF GOVERNMENT⁷⁸

The "October Manifesto" was eagerly applauded by the press. All that the representatives of the *zemstvos* had requested in November, 1904, seemed achieved. The San Francisco *Call* very enthusiastically declared that all the Russian people had been striving for during the last three centuries had been won.⁷⁹ The *Chronicle* editorially rejoiced that a "stroke of the pen" had written the "death warrant of Romanoff autocracy and changed Russia from an absolute into a limited monarchy."⁸⁰ In a front page diagram, the *Examiner* dramatically announced the changes the Imperial Manifesto had brought to Russia:

Autocratic government, as it	* Popular government, as it ex-
was in Russia yesterday	* ists in Russia today

Absolute power by the Czar	* A limited monarchy
Popular representation a farce	* A cabinet responsible to the
	* people

⁷⁴ S.F. *Call*, Oct. 24, 25, 26, and 27, 1905.

⁷⁵ S.F. *Call*, Nov. 1, 1905.

⁷⁶ S.F. *Call*, Oct. 31, 1905.

⁷⁷ S.F. *Chronicle*, Oct. 31, 1905.

⁷⁸ S.F. *Call*, Oct. 31, 1905.

⁷⁹ S.F. *Call*, Oct. 31, 1905.

⁸⁰ S.F. *Chronicle*, Oct. 31, 1905.

Peasants practically slaves	* A chairman chosen by people
Personal liberty dead	* Immunity of person
Censorship of the press	* Freedom of press
Religious liberty denied	* Freedom of religion
Privacy of mails unknown	* Right of <i>habeas corpus</i>
Education a make-believe	* Freedom of education ⁸¹

The press also rejoiced over developments in Finland. A national strike during the first week of November had been successful. On November 7, 1904, Nicholas II, by Imperial Manifesto, granted autonomy to the Grand Duchy. For the first time since 1899, the Estates General was allowed to meet in Helsingfors. A modern liberal constitution was drafted for Finland. It provided for a single house parliament elected by universal suffrage of both men and women.

The Czar's "October Manifesto" kindled the hopes of Poland. During the first week of November, huge crowds in Warsaw and other Polish cities rejoiced in the feeling that a new day was dawning. Through elaborately decorated streets, processions sang "God Save Poland" and carried the White Eagle, the emblem of old Poland. Polish leaders demanded the full autonomy that had been theirs before the Polish constitution had been suppressed during the revolution of 1863.⁸² The ease with which the general strike in Finland compelled the Czar to grant that Duchy autonomy encouraged the Poles. But their hopes that similar tactics would lead to autonomy for their land were soon crushed. The attempt of the Poles to organize a general strike was regarded as an act of revolt. Martial law was proclaimed in the province. The Czar's forces soon reestablished their hated control with only a few minor concessions.⁸³

In the meantime, the bay area newspapers began to temper their enthusiasm concerning liberalism in Russia. It was soon realized that the Czar did not intend to surrender autocratic authority. The "October Manifesto" was not as liberal as it first appeared. The cabinet was not to be responsible to the assembly, but to the Czar. The new *douma* was prohibited from considering military matters of foreign policy and was restricted in domestic legislation by a veto of the Czar.⁸⁴

⁸¹ S.F. *Examiner*, Oct. 31, 1905

⁸² S.F. *Chronicle*, Nov. 5, 1905.

⁸³ S.F. *Chronicle*, Nov. 11, 12, Dec. 2 and 24, 1905.

⁸⁴ S.F. *Chronicle*, Nov. 7, 1905

A renewal of revolutionary activity in Moscow, Odessa, and St. Petersburg, and mutinies in Kronstadt and Sebastopol caused the press to be apprehensive. The editors saw three dangers to the success of democratic institutions in Russia. The first was that Russia was not yet ready for democracy. The *San Francisco Call* and *Chronicle* pointed out that for a successful democracy, an educated and enlightened populace with self-control, and respect for law and order, was essential. These elements, it was agreed, were absent entirely in Russia. The second danger was that the Russian people in their enthusiasm for reform would be misled by the doctrines of Socialists and other revolutionary agitators. Such agitation would play into the hands of the Czar. A reaction would set in and the old autocracy could be restored with little reform.⁸⁵ The third danger was seen most clearly by the *Sacramento Union*: "the imperial proclamation will not wash away the memories of foul persecutions, of shameful indignities, of torture, of the prison cell."⁸⁶ Russia's greatest danger was from the irreconcilable revolutionists within and the swarms of exiles outside her borders who thirst for revenge.

History was to justify the apprehensions of the editors. The liberal movement soon collapsed. Autocracy returned. Almost all concessions that had been won were lost. The secret police, aided by troops returning from the Far East, regained control. Arbitrary and oppressive practices again were instituted. As the editors predicted, the stage was set for a second and much more violent revolution. The Czar's autocracy was destroyed, yet most of the diabolical methods of the old regime, to which the bay area editors of that era objected so strongly, were retained and are practiced today by the Soviets.

⁸⁵ *S.F. Call*, Nov. 4, 1905; *S.F. Chronicle*, Nov. 11, 1905.

⁸⁶ *Sacramento Union*, Nov. 1, 1905.

FROM ENEMY TO ALLY

A Survey of Anglo-French Relations

HERBERT WEINSCHEL, PH.D.

(Continued from January issue)

III. From Vienna to Versailles (1815-1919):

FROM NEUTRAL TO ALLY

Never again was France to become an aggressor. Britain continued to play her role as the "balancer" all through the 19th century and possibly to an even greater extent than ever before, but rarely was it France against whom Britain from now on had to use her power. It was rather Russia in the second part of the 19th century and Germany in the early years of the 20th century that took the place of France as antagonists of Britain. It may be convenient to review at this point the patterns of British foreign policy as they have emerged on the basis of the previous developments in Modern Times, and as they will appear again in the discussion of later events, to be taken up in the following pages. England and later Britain always threw her weight into the scales to prevent any one state or combination of states from controlling the continent and thereby becoming a menace to her insular position as well as to the independence of all the other states. This has been especially seen in her struggle against France during the eras of Louis XIV and Napoleon.

She was also at all times very sensitive about the Netherlands: no strong power should control these provinces. This partly explains (a) the assistance which Queen Elizabeth extended to the rebellious Netherlanders against their king Philip II, (b) Britain's intervention in the wars against Louis XIV who aimed at the absorption of the Netherlands by France, and (c) Britain's wars against France after the Revolution because of the accomplishment of that aim. It also explains Britain's entrance into the First World War against Germany immediately upon the invasion of Belgium by the latter power. Britain preferred to see the southern Netherlands¹⁰ in the hands of Spain (as the Spanish Netherlands) and after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) in the hands of Austria (as the Austrian Netherlands) rather than in those

¹⁰ The northern Netherlands, which had broken away from Spain in the late 16th century, were recognized as an independent state under the name "United Provinces of the Netherlands" in the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

of France because the first two were distant powers and hence no threat to Britain's position while France was a neighboring power which by incorporating only the Spanish (Austrian) Netherlands—even without the addition of the northern (Dutch) Netherlands—would have been a formidable menace to Britain. She also feared that her commercial interests would be impaired by such a change.

These were the foundations of the foreign policies of Britain in regard to the continent of Europe. As has been seen, she was also guided by these considerations in her attitude towards France. It was, therefore, necessary to state the general principles underlying Britain's policies in order to understand better her policies in regard to France. Hence, when France after 1815 ceased to be an aggressor and a menace to the equilibrium in Europe, Britain also ceased to oppose her. This was only logical on the basis of the premises, as stated above. Only when France became a competitor of Britain in colonial expansion in Africa late in the 19th century, did the old rivalry flare up again. But that is another story which will be taken up later. Meanwhile the two powers cooperated as members of the Concert of Europe, especially on the following occasions: both united with Russia in a humanitarian intervention against the Ottoman Empire to help the oppressed Greeks win their independence from the Turks (1827-1829), both took the leadership in the recognition of the independence of Belgium (1831) in which step they were joined by the other great powers Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Britain had also the satisfaction of seeing Belgium permanently neutralized on that occasion. In the Crimean War (1854-1856) France secured Britain's military assistance against Russia which had attacked the Ottoman Empire (1853) in the hope of conquering it without interference by the other great powers of Europe. Napoleon III needed glory for his new empire—established 1852—and saw here an opportunity to achieve it by intervention in the defense of the ailing Porte. He won Britain over to join him in this war.

So we see Britain and France, who had been on opposite sides in all wars in which they had taken part at least from 1689 to 1815, now for the second time within a quarter of a century fighting jointly against a common enemy.¹¹ Russia now took the place

¹¹ The first time they fought against the Ottoman Empire in the Greek War of Independence.

that France had held since the time of Louis XIV as Britain's antagonist. By her expansionist policies at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, Russia endangered the balance of power in Europe and, by her drive towards the Straits, Britain's position in the Mediterranean and her lifeline to India, protected by this position. Britain, therefore, was now to block further Russian expansion in the Near East as she had consistently blocked French expansion as long as France had been the aggressor. Russia, left to fight the Crimean War alone, was checked in her aims by the alliance formed against her. But this war—although fought jointly—had not made Britain and France permanent allies yet. Britain, for that matter, made no entangling alliances with other powers after the Congress of Vienna, but retained her full freedom of action in order to be able to use her influence for the preservation of the European equilibrium. Due to her success in this function as "balancer," the century of comparative peace and absence of universal wars between Waterloo and Sarajevo (1815-1914) is frequently described as *Pax Britannica*, being almost as unique in the annals of history as the period of the *Pax Romana* (31 B.C.-180A.D.), the only other such peaceful age preceding it.

In the later years of the reign of Napoleon III, Britain grew more and more suspicious of his policies, especially when he appeared to have designs upon Belgium. On the other hand, she did not oppose the unification of Germany and Italy and remained neutral in the struggles then going on to achieve those objectives. She was on friendly terms with Bismarck's Prussia and left Napoleon III to his fate at the outbreak of the Franco-German War (1870-1871), especially after Bismarck had assured her that his state would respect the neutrality of Belgium in the coming conflict. Britain became aroused only when Russia, in violation of the solemn guarantees given in Art. VII of the Treaty of Paris (1856) to "respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire," attacked that state, defeated it, and imposed upon it the harsh terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878). Prodded by Austria-Hungary, Britain joined the Dual Monarchy in a vigorous protest against that treaty, threatening intervention, i.e., war, unless its provisions would be revised by a congress of the signatories of the Treaty of Paris (1856). Russia finally consented to the holding of the Congress of Berlin (1878)

in the course of which the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were considerably modified in favor of the Ottoman Empire and Russia's further expansion in the Near East again checked. The net result of the settlement of Berlin was the stabilization of the political situation in the Near East for almost a generation. Not until 1908 did a major war threaten again in that area, and within the next six years the first world conflagration had its start there.

Meanwhile the rivalry between Britain and France was to flare up again over conflicting ambitions to establish colonial empires in Africa—the last continent to be divided among the powers of Europe. Britain's aim to establish a Cape-to-Cairo empire clashed with French plans to carve out an ocean-to-ocean empire—stretching across Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean—and the main bone of contention was the Eastern or Egyptian Sudan, comprising nearly one million square miles of territory, which both powers needed for the realization of their plans. Troops of both states penetrated the Sudan, and in 1898 the British and French met at the little village of Fashoda. Tension was running high in both countries and there was even talk of impending war, but the crisis was finally resolved peacefully; France yielded (1899), leaving to Britain the prize of the Egyptian Sudan and burying the cherished dream of an ocean-to-ocean empire in Africa. The Fashoda crisis was the last instance in which Britain and France opposed each other; it was a serious incident involving high stakes, but it was peaceably settled and—what was more—it marked a definite turning point in Anglo-French relations. The immediate result of Fashoda was a *rapprochement* between the two powers and the ultimate result—the *Entente Cordiale* of 1904.

The complete abandonment of French designs upon the Eastern Sudan taught Britain that she had nothing to fear from France, although the latter ultimately emerged with a colonial empire in Africa, not much smaller in territory than that acquired by Britain on that continent. On the other hand, the rapid advance and ambitious program of an aggressive Germany in colonial, commercial, and naval matters, which now under William II had discarded the cautious policies of Bismarck in regard to Britain, made her realize that she had everything to fear from the Reich. Furthermore, under the impact of the unfriendly and even hostile attitude on the part of world public opinion which she had to

face during the course of the Boer War, Britain finally came to the conclusion that she could no longer afford to remain in her vaunted "splendid isolation" without serious detriment to her interests and even her security. She thus came to a cordial understanding with France; both countries were motivated by fear of Germany. This understanding was expanded three years later (1907) by the inclusion of Russia—which had joined France in a military alliance in 1894—after Britain and Russia had composed their oldstanding differences. Here again the motivation on Britain's part was the fear of Germany, which had taken the place of France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I as the most serious threat to the European equilibrium and the most dangerous rival of Britain and her world position.

The product of this rather drastic reorientation of Britain—considering that she had kept aloof from alliances for nearly a century—was the Triple Entente which had the purpose to counterbalance the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Unlike the Triple Alliance, the Triple Entente—as far as Britain's participation was concerned—was not a military alliance, but only a friendly understanding to consult and cooperate on matters of common concern to its three members; this involved no formal obligations for Britain. The *Entente Cordiale* with France passed its first test when Britain backed her new friend at the Algeiras Conference (1906) in her dispute with Germany over Morocco and thus helped her score an important diplomatic victory over the Reich. France received even stronger support from Britain during a later crisis over Morocco (1911-1912); this made Germany realize that Britain would stand behind France in an ensuing conflict concerning this territory. This induced Germany to yield and gave France a protectorate over the largest part of Morocco (1912). In the same year (1912) Britain and France concluded a secret naval agreement in which Britain undertook to defend with its fleet the Atlantic seaboard of France against German attacks from the sea. Hereby Britain assumed a definite commitment of rendering military aid to France and it is, therefore, more than doubtful whether Britain could have stayed out of the First World War even if Belgium's neutrality had not been violated by Germany. In carrying out her obligations towards France, Britain would have invariably come into armed conflict with Germany.

When Germany declared war on Russia (August 1, 1914) and on France (August 3), Britain was still technically neutral and—except for the naval agreement with France which was secret—under no formal commitments to come to the aid of the other two members of the Triple Entente. But the German attack upon Belgium on August 4 cut the Gordian knot with dramatic suddenness, and Britain could now enter the war on the side of France and Russia because she wanted to redeem the guarantee which she had given—and Germany violated—to protect the permanent neutrality of Belgium (Art. 2 of the Treaty of London of 1839.) The developments of Anglo-French relations had completed a full circle: up to 1815 Britain had been engaged in century-long struggles against France, in the century to follow Britain for the most part took the position of a neutral in regard to France, but now in 1914 she was fighting as an ally on the side of France—a full-scale wartime alliance was concluded by the Pact of London in September, 1914—and for more than four years she was to remain locked with France in deadly combat against Germany. The two western allies remained loyal to the common cause until—with the aid of the United States—final victory was achieved over the Central Powers (1918).

France had been invaded by Germany twice within forty-four years, and when France won the second struggle after suffering immense human and material losses, she wanted to make sure that there should not be a third German invasion. She was well aware that unaided she would always be hopelessly outnumbered by Germany whose population even after her territorial losses fell only from 66 to 60 million as compared to a French population of barely 40 million, representing a nation which had ceased to grow by natural increase. France felt that the Rhine as boundary against Germany and a strong League of Nations, based on a military alliance of the members, would have offered her the desired security. But when she could get neither—not the Rhine boundary, because it would have violated the principle of national self-determination, and not the strong league, because President Wilson preferred a weak league—she wanted at least a guarantee against future German aggression from the United States and Britain. On the same day (June 28, 1919) on which the Treaty of Versailles was signed with Germany, two guarantee treaties were also signed by the United States and Britain with France. But when the United States Senate repudiated the Treaty of

Versailles—particularly because of its first part which contained the Covenant of the League of Nations—the Franco-American guarantee treaty, too, fell to the ground; and since it was not binding on the United States, the one with Britain also became inoperative.

IV. The Era of Indecision (1919-1939)

France was anxious to continue a formal alliance with Britain and made successive attempts in that direction, but Britain—now that the United States had again withdrawn into isolation—was very cool to the idea. She was motivated in her attitude by the emergence of France as the predominant power on the European continent and by the disappearance of the German menace—both as results of the First World War. Britain felt that France did not need further bolstering of her already leading continental position by means of a British alliance, but on the other hand she favored the recovery of Germany which she considered one of her most important markets. It was the traditional British policy not to support an already predominant power, but to work for an equilibrium on the continent that was now returning again after the defeat of her most dangerous rival, Germany. There were also certain jealousies between Britain and France in the Middle East in the early post-war period, but a further cooling-off of the feelings between the recent allies occurred when France in 1923 occupied the Ruhr Basin to exact further reparations from Germany, a step to which Britain was openly opposed because it tended to delay or possibly to destroy German recovery in which the trading spirit of Britain had shown so much interest. Left in the lurch by both the United States and Britain and not finding enough security in the weak machinery of the League of Nations, France resorted to building a system of alliances with lesser European states surrounding the former Central Powers or their remnants—Germany and the “succession states” Austria and Hungary. This French Bloc consisted of—besides France—Belgium, Poland (which should take the place of pre-war Russia), and Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the latter three forming among themselves the “Little Entente.”

Britain had again withdrawn into the “splendid isolation” which she had maintained during most of the 19th century—forgetting the lessons of the First World War and unmindful of the possibilities that the events, which forced her out of her isola-

tion the first time, might repeat themselves—only on a grander scale. Britain did not desert the league, as the United States had done. But she did little to strengthen this organization. The success of the league depended on the whole-hearted cooperation of Britain and France, the two remaining leading powers. But when France made an attempt to strengthen the league system by the Geneva Protocol (1924) which defined aggression and provided for compulsory arbitration of all international disputes, Britain refused to ratify this agreement; for she feared that it would force her to police the world. Thus the most ambitious step ever undertaken in the direction of compulsory settlement failed as a result of Britain's attitude. On the other hand, Britain—along with Italy—became a guaranteeing power of the Locarno Pact (1925) by which Germany voluntarily undertook to guarantee her western boundaries to France and Belgium as they had been laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. These two examples show that Britain sometimes cooperated with France and other states, at other times did not. Britain became also a signatory to the Pact of Paris (1928) which outlawed aggressive war, but this was not a sure test of her willingness to cooperate inasmuch as even isolationist United States signed this pact just because it did not impose any real obligations.

However, the real weakness of British foreign policy did not manifest itself with devastating clarity until the crucial period of the 1930's, characterized by the march of the aggressors who were permitted to "march" unchecked. Britain's appeasement of Japan during and after her attack upon Manchuria (1931-1933) prevented any strong action or, for that matter, *any* action—beyond a pious condemnation of her aggression—against this first aggressor among the great powers and undermined the prestige of the league which up to that time had not yet suffered any serious setback. Since the fate of collective security and consequently the restraining of aggressors depended upon the whole-hearted cooperation of the two leading democracies, Britain and France, the defection of one of them was sufficient to bring about the collapse of the machinery of the league and thereby to assure the triumph of the aggressors. Not that France could be left entirely without blame for the events which inevitably led to these dire results. But if we attempt to distribute the responsibility between the two for the disastrous events of the 1930's, we must definitely assign to Britain the lion's share of the responsibility

or even guilt for allowing events to drift so far that it was almost too late to redeem the balance when Britain finally decided to call a halt to Hitler.

We can say this: if France could ever have been sure of British backing during the crucial thirties, she would have given the league her full support and would have taken a firm stand against aggressors and treaty violators. Unfortunately, France did not conduct, or did not feel strong enough to have, an independent foreign policy during those critical years, and did not want, by taking a determined stand against Nazi Germany, to lose the only support that she could expect, namely, Britain. Even the internal weaknesses of the Third Republic during those years must be attributed largely to her weak and vacillating foreign policy, which could only be such because of lack of British backing. France would not have appeased Italy in her designs on Ethiopia—which she only did in order to keep Mussolini on her side against Hitler—had she been able to count on British assistance against Hitler. How little France could depend on British support in matters vital to her security, can be seen from the following incident: only three months after the repudiation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany and the announcement of German rearmament (March 16, 1935) Britain reached a naval agreement with Nazi Germany (June 18, 1935), conceding to her 35 per cent of British naval strength in surface war vessels and placing no restrictions on submarines—thereby openly condoning Germany's recent treaty violation and double-crossing France which saw her security endangered by German military strength.

France tried to stem the German tide by concluding (May 2, 1935) a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union which also became alarmed by the resurgence of Germany. The Franco-Soviet Assistance Pact in turn gave Hitler a convenient excuse for renouncing the Locarno Pact and remilitarizing the Rhineland almost exactly a year after his rearmament announcement (March 7, 1936). Hitler, of course, failed to mention what everybody who followed the events knew, that it was that first announcement which caused France and the Soviet Union to draw closer together. Hitler's denunciation of Locarno was well timed to coincide with a decisive stage in the league deliberations concerning more effective sanctions against Italy in order to save Ethiopia. Hitler's bold move had the aim of throwing the league

into confusion so that the league members rather than to take drastic action against both violators would be so stunned as to take no action at all. And so it happened. Further coercive measures—such as an embargo on oil which might have stopped Mussolini's war machine—were immediately dropped, and the only "step" that was taken against Hitler by the league council was a "paper" protest—such as had also been issued upon the rearmament announcement a year earlier—condemning unilateral renunciation of treaty obligations.

If the British statesmen of the time had been earnestly determined to uphold collective security and to restrain treaty violators, they would not have permitted themselves, nor would they have permitted others, to be thrown into confusion by the antics of the aggressors, but would have taken a firm stand to *stop* aggressors once for all. France was ready to act against Hitler, but it could only act if it could count on British aid. Other states would have followed the British lead, because Britain's prestige was still high at that time. But Britain was not prepared to act; it was the Britain of Stanley Baldwin and soon of Neville Chamberlain which was falling to its lowest ebb of political ineptitude in the highest places, and not yet the Britain of Winston Churchill whose warnings at that time went unheeded and who was spared for later, to "launch the lifeboats," after his predecessors—by their timidity, mixed with stupidity—had brought about the most disastrous shipwreck the world had ever seen.

In 1936 Hitler could have been stopped by a mere show of force without resort to war, or at the most by a short war. At that time Hitler Germany was not yet sufficiently prepared militarily and did not yet possess fortifications—the West Wall or Siegfried Line was not built until 1938. Britain, France, Belgium, and other states whose participation in a campaign against Germany might have been expected were at that time together still superior to Germany. If the western democracies had taken positive action at that point, there would have been no Second World War into which they were finally forced by their own political ineptitude. As a result of political or military defeat Hitler would have been overthrown in 1936 or 1937; a dictatorship cannot survive such setbacks: this was proven by later events in both Italy and Germany. And since a German state would have survived—without Hitler and Nazism,¹² there would have been no opportunity for

¹² At that time Nazism was not yet so firmly entrenched in Germany as two or three years later.

Soviet expansion to the West and, hence, for Soviet communism to become a menace to the world.

All this would have been possible *if* Britain had been willing to *act*. But Britain had already embarked upon the road to appeasement, a policy usually associated with the name of Neville Chamberlain. While the latter brought this disastrous trend to its sorry perfection, the policy was really started by his predecessor Baldwin. Just as Pertinax (André Géraud) named Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud, Pétain, and Laval the Gravediggers of France,¹³ the two Prime Ministers and arch-appeasers Baldwin and Chamberlain could be aptly called the gravediggers of Britain and nearly of the world—if it had not been for Winston Churchill. By 1936 every clear-headed person could see in what direction Hitler was moving. It was no more a question of legitimate German interests; all such arguments were only used to mask designs for world conquest.¹⁴ On the other hand, Mussolini—*without* Hitler—was no real menace. As events during the Second World War were to prove, Mussolini or, more accurately, his Italy was not a serious menace even with Hitler as ally. Mussolini could have been handled if only the western democracies had been willing to pursue a consistent policy against aggression. The Hoare-Laval proposal to “settle” the Ethiopian affair was obviously not the right approach to this problem.

Leadership was needed on the part of Britain and France, which were still world powers in the 1930's, to preserve the League of Nations and stop aggressors, just as in recent years the United States, the sole remaining world power among the democracies, has assumed leadership to check Soviet expansion. Although the league had been weakened from its inception by its repudiation on the part of the United States, it could have survived if the two remaining great democracies, Britain and France, had provided the necessary leadership in its support. Here again it was mainly *Britain's* leadership that was needed because France usually lent the league her support, and France would have fallen in line if she had known that she could consistently count on British cooperation. But rather than provide *positive* leadership in supporting the league and opposing aggressors, Britain in the 1930's disgraced herself by—what could be

¹³ In his book bearing the same title (Doubleday, Doran, 1944).

¹⁴ Hitler despised France, but he imitated her greatest military leader, Napoleon.

called—*negative* leadership. She became the *leader* in appeasing aggressors, thereby sacrificing the league. France alone could not pursue a different foreign policy; besides, the unchecked rise of Fascism—which term includes also Nazism—had brought on internal convulsions so that there was nothing left for her but to dance to the British tune. By 1938 the British appeasers, Chamberlain and Halifax, had their counterpart in the French appeasers Daladier and Georges Bonnet.¹⁵ France was then completely following the British lead. And the British could only lead to disaster.¹⁶

A certain parallel can be found between the foolish foreign policy of Napoleon III and the British-French appeasers of pre-Munich days. Napoleon III first (1859) fought Austria to help with the unification of Italy; then (1866) by his neutrality permitted Prussia to defeat Austria and assume leadership in Germany, always hoping for some “compensations” from Bismarck which had been hinted at by him rather vaguely at Biarritz (1865); and finally found himself alone and friendless and provoked into a war with Prussia (1870) which under the circumstances could only end in disaster for France. So, too, the British-French appeasers of Hitler hoped that he would turn the Teutonic fury against the East—they still remembered Kaiser Wilhelm’s *Drang nach Osten*—and would become so deeply involved in his penetration into Soviet territory that he would leave the West alone. And Hitler did everything on his part to strengthen them in this belief. Hadn’t he just concluded an Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan (November, 1936), later joined by Italy (November, 1937)? Irony of fate wanted it that the western powers when even *they* at last could see through Hitler’s aims of world conquest, become engaged in war with Nazi Germany (September 3, 1939) long before his attack on the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941). And the continental powers of western Europe (Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Belgium, and France) were overrun (April-June, 1940) and insular Britain “airblitzed” (from

¹⁵ To be distinguished from Henri Bonnet who is the present French Ambassador to the United States.

¹⁶ How Chamberlain made his own “foreign policy” and not only disregarded the advice given him by his Foreign Office, but did not even consult with the top officials of this expert body, can be seen from Lord Vansittart’s brilliantly written article, “The Decline of Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1950, pp. 177-188, especially p. 186.

the summer of 1940 until the spring of 1941) before the Germans set foot on Soviet soil.

So the western powers wanted to let Hitler have the Soviet Union or as much of it as he could digest. But between Germany and the Soviet Union lay Central Eastern Europe, comprised of states which Hitler had to take first, before he could reach Soviet territory. The western powers knew that on his *Drang nach Osten* he would have to absorb into his orbit these states first, before he could really get to the East, i. e., to Communist Russia. And the western powers showed by their attitude clearly that they would not object if Hitler subdued those "buffer states" first, as long as he continued on his march eastward. This explains why Britain declared herself disinterested in the fate of the states of Central Europe and gave Hitler a free hand in that region, and why she sacrificed Austria and Czechoslovakia. In November, 1937, Britain's Lord Halifax on his visit to Germany left the German government with the impression that while Britain and France favored peaceful solutions they would not oppose Germany by force in Central Europe. This was sufficient assurance for Hitler to proceed speedily with the planned annexation of Austria. When Hitler performed the *Anschluss* of Austria on March 13, 1938, the two western powers reacted only with a feeble protest which in view of Halifax's attitude must be considered as somewhat hypocritical. It was also completely in line with British foreign policy, as previously described, to sacrifice the *Sudetenland* to Hitler; the shame of Munich (September 29, 1938) was only a *climax*, and not a novel development, in a policy of appeasement which had begun with the appeasing of Japan and had been expanded to the European continent. By collaborating with Britain in sacrificing the *Sudetenland*, France deserted her military alliance with Czechoslovakia. But by this time France had no more any will of her own. She was just doing what Britain wanted to be done.

V. The Common Ordeal and Renewed Unity (1939-1950)

How the two western powers could have expected that the rump of Czechoslovakia could have been preserved after her partial absorption by Germany, is difficult to comprehend. The fate of Czechoslovakia was sealed at Munich—with foreknowledge of the western statesmen—and not five and a half months later when Hitler destroyed that state. It is, therefore, hard to understand Chamberlain's surprise when Hitler, violating the

"guarantee" given at Munich, made an end to the existence of Czechoslovakia (March 15, 1939). When Chamberlain finally began to awaken from his vain dream that he could appease Hitler, this was not so much a result of what had befallen the rump of Czechoslovakia, as it was the first dawning of the realization that *Hitler could not be stopped by continuous yielding, but only by opposition*. Then Chamberlain abruptly reversed his previous policy and began to build a "peace front" against Germany by seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union (which had been snubbed during the "deal" concerning Czechoslovakia) and by offering British guarantees to any potential victim of Nazi aggression. In pursuance of this new policy Britain gave guarantees to Poland (which was next on Hitler's menu card), Rumania, Greece, and Turkey. Protracted and halting negotiations with the Soviet Union for the purpose of an alliance were only broken off when the world was startled by the conclusion of a ten-year Pact of Non-Aggression between the supposedly two greatest antagonists, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (August 23, 1939). Hitler had thereby secured his back, could fight Poland and then turn against the West. Two days later (August 25) Britain concluded a military alliance with Poland; France had been allied with Poland since 1921 and the alliance had been revived in 1936 and when Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France, after an unsuccessful attempt at mediation by Mussolini, redeemed their guarantee to Poland and declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

The Second World War was on, and Britain and France were finally forced to fight against Germany. But at this stage (September, 1939) they had to fight a war on Hitler's terms. Continued appeasement had failed miserably, and even the men of Munich, Chamberlain and Daladier, had at last realized that further yielding would never satisfy Hitler's appetite, that they would have to make a stand against new demands. Now the western powers were compelled to fight because the alternative would have been *extinction*. Thus it can be seen that the policy of appeasement did not secure peace for the western powers—its pretended aim—but, on the contrary, finally led to *war on a détour* which proved both lengthy and permanently very costly. It brought loss of status as world powers and impoverishment for both Britain and France. In 1936 Hitler would have had to fight a war, had war been necessary at all, on *their* terms.

The story of the Second World War does not have to be told here—it is too well known—except for a few important instances which concern Anglo-French relations. These relations reached an anti-climax when Winston Churchill, in the days when France was falling before the merciless onslaught of the German armies, dramatically proposed (June 16, 1940) to the then Premier of France, Paul Reynaud, a Franco-British political union, and urged the French government not to make an armistice with the invader, but to continue the fight from the French possessions in Africa—just as, it can be added, Britain would have done if Germany had succeeded in conquering the British Isles. In that case the British government would have moved its seat to Canada and fought on from there. This proposal of a union was rejected by the French government, and a few days later an armistice was concluded with the Axis powers¹⁷ after Marshal Pétain had replaced Reynaud as premier.

Soon relations between Britain and France reached another climax; Britain was compelled in self-preservation to sink on July 3, 1940, a considerable part of the French fleet at Oran (Algeria) in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Germans to be used by Hitler in a possible invasion of her homeland. It is to be remembered that this was the time when Britain stood alone against the Axis and that the barrier to a complete Axis victory was then only the twenty-one miles of the English Channel. France broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. But this was no more republican France, it was already Vichy France which was fascist and collaborating with Nazi Germany. "Free France" continued the war from abroad under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. But even the Vichy government, however antagonistic it was to Britain, did not disgrace itself to the extent of joining the Axis powers in their war against Britain.

After the liberation of France from the Germans in the summer of 1944, Britain and France both participated in the San Francisco Conference (April 25-June 26, 1945) where the United Nations was established, and both were given permanent seats in the Security Council. This gave legal recognition to their status as great powers, a position which entitles them to the exercise of the veto power. But unlike the period after the First

¹⁷ Italy had entered the war against the Allies (June 10, 1940) when France was already beaten.

World War, relations between the two wartime allies did not cool off when hostilities ended this time. Conditions were not the same when the Second World War ended as they had been after the first great war. True, the German menace which had this time been even more formidable than on the earlier occasion (1914-1918) had been again eliminated. However, this time, not France, but the Soviet Union emerged as the predominant power on the continent of Europe and as one of the two super-powers of the world.

Britain learned her lesson from the Second World War; she was now ready for a formal military alliance with France, providing for mutual automatic assistance against future German aggression during a period of fifty years. This alliance was concluded with great solemnity at the historic city of Dunkirk on March 4, 1947 where the heroic evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force had been performed between May 29 and June 3, 1940 in "Britain's darkest hour." Although both emerged weakened from the Second World War, the Dunkirk alliance should offer the two states sufficient protection against a resurgent Germany on the basis of manpower and resources. Against a German population of about 70 million, Britain and France together have one of about 90 million. Had France had such an alliance with Britain after the First World War, there would have certainly been no appeasement of Hitler on the part of France and, if Britain had lived up to her commitments, Hitler would have been checked at much lesser cost before he had become too big to handle. But it took two World Wars and a near-defeat for Britain to learn the lesson.

However, the Treaty of Dunkirk was only the beginning from which agreements of wider scope were to follow. When it appeared more and more clearly that the Soviet Union was bent upon expansion of its orbit into Western Europe,¹⁸ Britain and France, joined by the three smaller western democracies (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg), on March 17, 1948 established the Western Union by the Treaty of Brussels, pledging mutual automatic "military and other aid and assistance" against any "armed attack in Europe" (Article IV)—i.e., not necessarily German, but also Soviet attack—for a period of fifty years, and

¹⁸ Its threat to Greece and Turkey was met by the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed by the President of the United States on March 12, 1947.

besides close cooperation in economic, social, and cultural matters. The Western Union again was only the point of departure for a much wider defense agreement, based on the same principle of mutual self-defense against aggression, but reaching across the Atlantic and linking ten European states with the Western Hemisphere Defense System, as established by the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of September 2, 1947. This culminating defense pact is the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 which pledges its signatories—ten European and two North-American states (the United States and Canada)—to mutual—although not automatic and not necessarily military—assistance for a period of twenty years. The special significance of the last-named treaty lies in the fact that the United States for the first time in her history joined European states in a formal alliance. But the United States has realized—what Britain failed to realize after the First World War—that the war against Nazi aggression would have been fought in vain if the United States as the leading power of the Western World had ceased to take a firm stand against future aggression from whatever side it might come. And this treaty serves notice on any future aggressor that the United States will remain alert to any such step.

Thus we see that what originally began as a bilateral treaty between Britain and France—namely, the Dunkirk Treaty—grew a year later into a five-power treaty—the Western Union—and expanded another year later into a twelve-power treaty, establishing the North Atlantic Community for Collective Self-Defense. Of course, Britain and France are both signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty—as are also the three other members of the Western Union—and they all participate in the Council of Europe, set up on May 5, 1949. This organization has at present only advisory functions and not yet governmental powers, but it marks a hopeful beginning in the direction of an—admittedly still distant—United States of Europe. The rationale for concluding the Brussels or Western Union, the Rio Treaty, and the North Atlantic Treaty—all regional pacts of collective self-defense under Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter—must be found in the present inability of the Security Council—the only organ of the organization entrusted with taking action in the field of international peace and security—not only to function effectively, but to function at all.

THE OUTLOOK

However weakened Britain and France were from the Second World War, they will still have to play an important role in the future as upholders and—if necessary—defenders of the principles of democracy and western civilization against the forces of Asiatic despotism and oppressive communism, as represented by the Soviet Union. Fortunately, this time—unlike the period after the First World War—their relations are close and cordial and they are cooperating whole-heartedly. In his “Western Union” speech in the House of Commons on January 22, 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said: “I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe. First in this context we think of the people of France. . . . I doubt whether ever before in our history there has been so much underlying good-will and respect between the two peoples as now.” That they do not always agree immediately on *all* points at issue, should not detract from the over-all picture which shows that they will before long reach agreement on all *important* questions.¹⁹ Fortunately, too, this time the United States is a full partner to the enterprise of preserving western civilization against lurking aggressors by bolstering the moral and material defenses of the European states, in order to enable them to resist in the “cold war.” This is done in the correct realization that there is no more effective deterrent to an aggressor than firmness backed by military strength—a lesson which the British and French appeasers of the thirties so terribly missed. This new policy in which the United States has assumed leadership must be tried and it may even preserve peace. The policy of the appeasers certainly brought—war.

¹⁹ A recent example would be the Schuman Plan, proposed by the French Foreign Minister, M. Robert Schuman, for “pooling” French, German and other European coal and steel production, to which the British government has not subscribed yet, but there are some prospects that it might eventually join. On the British attitude towards the Schuman Plan, see A. Comstock, “British Economic Policy: IV. The Schuman Plan,” *Current History*, December, 1950, pp. 348-351.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

MEDIAEVAL

Peter and Paul, Apostles, An Account of the Early Years of the Church, by Isidore O'Brien, O.S.F. New Jersey. St. Anthony's Guild Press. 1950. pp. 440. \$3.50.

That section of young Catholic America which happily is daily growing more and more enthusiastic in attention to the Mystical Body and the other throbbing activities of the Church will welcome this volume as a heaven-sent contribution to their armory of salvation. Their ardor might not endure the ponderous erudition of the great theologians who have recently followed the footsteps of Peter and of Paul verifying every impression of their sacred feet throughout their apostolic journeyings. But here we have, as it were a map, that shows the routes at a glance and a lucid and ample commentary that points out their significance.

Yet this book is no primer. Its charming and distinctive feature is that it puts into a language that anyone may read, and almost restfully, enlightening information on matters that to every Christian mind is precious knowledge.

In an earlier volume *Life of Christ*, Father O'Brien retells in one sequence the narratives of the four gospels; in the present work he goes on with his elucidation of biblical wisdom, recapitulating the Acts of the Apostles and the Letters of St. Paul.

Some idea of the accuracy of his investigation and of the labor given to his production may be gathered from an inspection of the references that follow each of the eleven chapters and the epilogue; and turning from these to the richness of the text one may well wonder whether this work should not be listed in the same category as those tomes of the European scholars whose appearance won world-wide acclaim.

Laurence J. Kenny, Saint Louis University.

Chaucer and His England, by G. G. Coulton. New York. E. P. Dutton. Reprint of the 4th edition. pp. 321. \$4.50.

Since the first edition of this work in 1908 was reviewed by no less an authority than G. K. Chesterton, a brief review of the book should suffice. This is particularly true in the light of the author's statements that he has seen fit to make but few changes

in the second edition, 1908, the third in 1921 and the fourth in 1927.

The first six chapters of the book are given to Chaucer's life; chapters 7, 8, 9, 10 to the London of his day; chapters 11, 12, 13 to the Canterbury Tales, while the remaining eleven chapters are designed "to portray the England of that day in those features which throw most light on the peculiarities of Chaucer's men and women." (p. 75).

The whole is done in typical Coulton style which, unless one is familiar with his technique, will often lead one to false conclusions. With his facts there is no quarrel, but his inferences and interpretations can readily mislead the uninformed. Of necessity he must give some amount of consideration to the Church and the clergy of the period, but here he is dealing with something he cannot understand. He is never able to distinguish between the institution and its doctrines on the one hand and the varying degrees of observance of those doctrines, even on the part of many of the clergy, on the other. In other respects the reader will find the book both enlightening and interesting.

The best chapters are on the "Knights and Squires" (Chap. XV) and on "The Great War" (Chap. XVIII). The former is largely concerned with the state of chivalry during Chaucer's period and should serve the useful purpose of relieving the imagination of the casual reader of English literature of many erroneous impressions. The gentleman of 1350 is quite effectively deglamourized. The dozen pages on the 100 Year's War are chiefly interesting because of his chauvinistic outbursts, but in spite of these he presents a good brief picture of the strain of the war upon the country at large. The demoralizing effects of the war upon the population of both France and England are summarized in the following chapter.

The value of the book is enhanced for ready reference by five pages of Index and various illustrations largely from contemporary sources.

Charles E. Schrader, University of Detroit.

Medieval Papalism, The Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists, by Walter Ullmann. London. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1949. pp. 230. 18s. net.

The tone of this work may be gathered from the following highly typical quotation, "The *petitio principii* is perhaps the

most striking feature of all medieval scholarship, and is nowhere more glaringly marked than with the canonists in particular and the papalists in general. Very properly has Hegel declared that 'the character of all philosophy in the Middle Ages was a thinking, an understanding, a philosophizing with a premise'. Indeed, the a-hypothetical method of inquiry was hardly known to medieval people."

A great deal of work has gone into the preparation of the book and a few occasionally useful items turned up as, for example, the reference in the footnote on page 26 from Nicholas of Paris, "*Politica dicitur a polis, quod est civitas . . . ultimae partes scilicet economica et politica, sicut quidam dicunt, traduntur in legibus et decretis . . .*"

For the rest, however, it would have been very much better if the author had followed his own excellent advice, "For about the ideological undercurrents and cross currents continually bursting forth and shaking the somewhat flimsy structure of medieval Europe we know as yet far too little to sit in judgment. As the late occupant of the Cambridge medieval chair so truthfully said in his Birkbeck lectures, 'it seems far more important to understand than to judge.' What we can and should do is to throw open the gateways to the medieval mental laboratories, so as to be able to explain and understand that period in its richness. One such gateway the canonists alone are able to unlock for us."

B. W. Dempsey, Nirmala College, New Delhi.

MODERN

The Holy See and the Irish Movement for the Repeal of the Union with England, 1829 to 1847, by John F. Broderick, S. J. *Analecta Gregoriana*; Cura Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae Edit. Vol. LV. Series Facultatis Historiae Ecclesiasticae; Sectio B (n.9). Romae. Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae. 1951. pp. xxvii., 237.

There is still a great deal of truth in the statement made by Professor George O'Brien some twenty-five years ago, that the history of Ireland since the Union in 1800 has yet to be written. There is of course no dearth of books which bear the title; but most of these belong to a type of literature that has little claim to be regarded as history. It is however an encouraging sign

that the material required for such a history is gradually accumulating in monographs which reveal at once a degree of scholarship that has too often been wanting, and a temper very different from that which informs so many books on the subject. This little book adds substantially to that material. Father Broderick has essayed one of the most difficult and most controversial episodes in the history of O'Connell's career; and he has completed his task in a manner which distinguishes his work sharply from almost everything that has previously been written on the subject.

The substance of the book consists of a detailed narrative of the successive phases of the agitation in Ireland, and an examination of the attitude of the Papacy towards the movement and towards the British government, which repeatedly requested the pope to intervene and put a stop to it. The account of the campaign in Ireland is vivid, but a good deal of the detail is repetitious, and the author has relied too much on that portion of the Irish press which supported the movement. It is scarcely possible, for example, to accept the figures here given for attendance at O'Connell's repeal meetings. The most striking feature is the evidence of the extent to which the Irish clergy took part in the movement. O'Connell declared in 1843 that he had the active support of the lower clergy almost to a man, and that he could count on a majority of the bishops and archbishops. The claim was probably justified, and there were those among the clergy whose language was hardly less violent than that of the leader himself. Towards O'Connell Father Broderick's attitude is sympathetic but not uncritical. More than once he emphasizes the egregious lack of judgment which led the Liberator to assume that what had been achieved in the matter of Catholic Emancipation in 1829 could be repeated on a larger scale and by the same methods in the matter of the Union.

The most illuminating chapters are those on the papacy. In general, the authorities at Rome were more than ready to comply with the requests of the British government whenever it was possible to do so; and on its part that government was not backward in making its requests. A secret agent was maintained in Rome from 1832 onward; and on one occasion at least, the support of Metternich was sought and obtained. But the demand for a "public and unequivocal condemnation" of clerical participation in O'Connell's campaign was never complied with. The situation caused grave anxiety at Rome, and paternal admonitions

were issued from time to time, pointing out the danger to religion that would result from this mingling in politics. But the matter was not so simple as it seemed to politicians like Palmerston and Metternich. To the Irish clergy the question of repealing the Union was not simply a matter of politics. It involved the moral and spiritual life of the Irish people, as well as the form of their government; and, given the conditions in Ireland during these years, it is difficult to assume that their judgment was wholly wrong. What is evident is that any direct command from Rome would almost certainly have been flouted. It was a curious situation: a Protestant government bombarding the pope with requests for intervention, and a devoutly Catholic people firmly denying the right of the pope to intervene in any way.

The book is clearly written, and the discussion of sources in the introduction will be of great value. But there are far too many printing errors, some of them seriously altering the sense of the text; and the binding is inexcusably bad, even for a brochure of this kind. A book that is worth printing is worth binding well enough to keep the pages in place for at least one reading.

D. J. McDougall, University of Toronto.

The Foundation of Australia (1786-1800), by Eris O'Brien. Sydney. Angus and Robertson. P.D. and Ione Perkins, American Distributors, South Pasadena, California. 1950. pp. xii, 327. \$3.15.

This scholarly work ought to receive a warm welcome from American historians, for it is a careful, well-balanced, copiously documented account of the beginnings of Australia. Dr. Eris O'Brien, noted Catholic historian and recently elevated to the Australian hierarchy, first brought out the study in 1937; such has been the continued esteem for its excellence that a second edition, as a university reference work, has been called for.

A little less than a third of the book is devoted to the English background, which must be known if the ideas and the workings of the Penal Transportation are to be properly understood. The author writes most interestingly of the political, social and economic conditions in which the late eighteenth century Englishman, honest or criminal, lived; then he summarizes the criminal laws and their punishments; and finally discusses the contemporary reformers with their successes and failures. The number of

capital crimes, about two hundred and fifty, is certainly shocking; although the author points out that many convictions were changed to transportation. One might gather that the conditions of the English proletariat of the last half of the eighteenth century were worse than that of the French lower classes. One other conclusion from Dr. O'Brien's work is that a large number of the convicts would hardly be classed as real criminals today; so trivial were their offenses. And that is not to speak about those convicted for political offenses, many of whom were of the noblest type.

The middle portion of the work, naturally the longest, deals with the history of the colony for the first fifteen years of its existence. Here the author discusses the planning of the colony which was to consist in part of freemen but mostly of convicts, the voyages out of the penal ships, the grave problems of the foundations, such as the employment, the feeding, the disposal and the liberation of the convicts. The whole scheme was never fully understood by those back in England who devised and directed it. Designing army officials found a way to establish rich and unscrupulous monopolies, which became the curse of the colony.

The third part is documentary, with excellent appendices on crimes and punishments, the numbers of the transported, pardons, expenses, problems of civil and commercial jurisdiction, and considerations of trade and commerce. The book is enriched with a most exhaustive bibliography; this alone makes the work a truly valuable contribution to the knowledge of the great Southern Commonwealth.

Martin P. Harney, Boston College.

The Age of Reason, by Frank E. Manuel. Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press. 1951. pp. ix, 146. \$1.25.

This is the second essay to be published in "The Development of Western Civilization" series. It is a "narrative essay" surveying the period from 1715 until 1789, the type of history writing which the staff at Cornell University have hit upon as the answer to the enduring problem of providing material for the introductory history course in college. This particular volume offers the accepted interpretation of the eighteenth century, incorporating most of the established findings of the last half century in that field. It is too sketchy to serve a useful purpose be-

yond the survey course, and whether the professor finds it useful here depends on how he has organized the students' outside reading. The chief criticism to be made of this essay is that it incorporates the work of authorities by taking "chunks" from each instead of mastering and synthesizing them all. One expects a "narrative essay" to be a unit with its own flavor. Despite this shortcoming, however, *The Age of Reason* is a reasonably good introduction to the eighteenth century, written from a moderately "liberal" viewpoint.

Thomas P. Neill, Saint Louis University.

British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1823, by William Kaufmann. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1951. pp. viii, 238. \$3.75.

This book makes delightful reading. Upon a theme as dry as diplomatic history can be allowed to become, the author pours the condiments which make this history palatable and easily assimilated. For he possesses an easily running style, has a gift for clever and original phrasing often encased in light sarcasm of pleasant irony, and knows sufficiently both his history and human nature so as to offer the reader true-to-life portraits of such statesmen as Pitt, Fox, Wellington, Castlereagh, Canning, and our own John Quincy Adams. The book is rich in the diplomatic history of the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic periods in Europe. The reader watches with fascination Russia's "mystic" Alexander I, Austria's subtle Metternich, and Spain's intransigent Ferdinand VII as each of them with others play their role within or outside of the Concert of Europe. The narrative is nicely unified, as the chapter headings indicate, by the dilemma concerning Latin America with which England was confronted: how to preserve her trade and friendship with the colonies before and after rebellion without at the same time offending or breaking with Spain whom she needed in the struggle against Napoleon. After Waterloo the going became easier, for England dominated, the Duc d'Angouleme invaded Spain to liberate her king, John Quincy Adams stole Cannings "Monroe Doctrine," and the last-mentioned broke up the "Concert." We watch the subtle plays behind the scenes of history's more resounding events and are given the background of the policies or lack of policies of states. We see the first movements of Britain towards the recognition of the Latin American nations, can understand

why the Portenos in gratitude have named a street in Buenos Aires after George Canning, and we are shown the stage setting for his grandiose pronouncement: "I resolved that if France had Spain it would not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

Outside the specialized field (about which the author knows much more than the reviewer) the text contains one or another assertion or implication not historically exact. For instance, that the settlement made by Alexander VI in 1493 between Spain and Portugal or the treaty of Tordesillas concluded the following year between the same colonizing powers envisaged in any way the Banda Oriental.

Peter M. Dunne, University of San Francisco.

AMERICAN

Cracker Parties, by Horace Montgomery. Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University Press. 1950. pp. viii, 278. \$4.00.

This study of Georgia politics in the 1850's exhibits the rarity of welding a mass of detailed information into a readable, easy-to-follow narrative. While *Cracker Parties* will never be an indispensable work to the general historian, it does an outstanding job of what reviewers often refer to as "filling a niche" in the history of the ante-bellum South. Perhaps the most valuable use of this volume will be in its information on the confused state of politics in Georgia as the issue of slavery convulsed the major parties nationally and in the inferences for the other Southern states that may be drawn for the examples given for the Cracker state.

The book is well made-up and attractive in typography. Errors are very few and unimportant.

Jasper W. Cross, Saint Louis University.

The War Without Grant, by Robert R. McCormick. New York. Bond Wheelwright Company. 1950. pp. 245. \$7.50.

Colonel McCormick's latest venture into historical writing is characterized by enthusiasm and a keen interest in his subject. Portions of it are readable and perhaps of some value, notably those dealing with military campaigns and strategy.

However, much of this volume would have been better left unwritten. Chapter one (and much of chapter two) is amateur-

ishly written and filled with sweeping generalizations, as those on slavery as the cause of the Civil War, on the Federalist party, and on Major Robert Anderson, many of which are not only overdrawn but inaccurate.

Although there are fairly good maps and index, there is no bibliography, virtually no sources used of any value, and the volume will be of little interest to the serious historian.

Jasper W. Cross, Saint Louis University.

Revolt of the Rednecks, Mississippi Politics: 1876-1925, by Albert D. Kirwan. Lexington. University of Kentucky Press. 1951. pp. 328. \$4.50.

Goaded beyond endurance by agrarian hecklers during the 1911 campaign, a Mississippi politician lost his temper and retaliated by shouting "rednecks" at his oppressors. Accepting an epithet as a badge of honor—as had the roundheads and sans-culottes before them—the Mississippi "rednecks" voted their heroes James K. Vardaman into the United States Senate and Theodore G. Bilbo into the state lieutenant-governorship.

Professor Kirwan's book is a detailed account of the state political history of Mississippi from the end of Reconstruction through the disintegration of the political dominance gained by the "rednecks" under the leadership of Vardaman and Bilbo.

The Democrats who gained control of politics at the close of Reconstruction were businessmen and lawyers interested in merchandising, railroads, corporations. Their strongholds were the towns and the Delta counties, over-represented in the legislature and in the all-important convention machinery by which candidates for office were selected. Their key weapon against any group—Republican, Independent, Greenbacker, Populist—seeking to take political advantage of the rising economic unrest among the white farmers in the under-represented counties was fear. Defection from the Democratic party, the farmers were warned, would return the Negroes to political control. The alternative to "white solidarity" was "black domination."

Low cotton prices, high debts, high taxes, high railroad rates, deflation increased the agrarian sense of oppression. To make its voting preponderance effective, the "redneck" group must gain control of the Democratic party. This required effective leadership and a change in political machinery. The substitution in 1902 of a primary for the state nominating convention set the stage for Vardaman's election as governor in 1903, although the

political revolution did not reach full fruition until the election of 1911. The primary law Kirwan terms "the most democratic measure" the white voters had yet secured. The law was "a move away from democracy" in that by a resolution of the state executive committee Negroes were excluded from voting. This clinched the matter of "white supremacy" in politics, really replacing provisions toward the same end in the 1890 constitution. Indeed the poll tax provided for in that document had its principal restricting effect upon white ballots.

In assessing Vardaman and Bilbo, Kirwan feels it unfair to term them "demagogues" unless their political opponents and associates also are so designated. All white Mississippians in politics agreed on the issue of "white supremacy." Vardaman was merely more outspoken than most. He was sincere; his tirades were not merely for effect. Campaigning was a dirty business. National issues apparently were seldom mentioned. Name-calling, accusations of bribery, drunkenness, immorality were the stock in trade. One is tempted to concur with the Greenwood editor who asserted: "Most anything that unfits . . . [a candidate] for heaven seems to commend him for office holding." Whatever the bars to heaven in the careers of Vardaman and Bilbo, Kirwan makes plain, these men while governors secured more constructive social legislation—improving prison conditions, strengthening welfare agencies, promoting education, regulating monopoly—than did their predecessors.

This is a useful if depressing book. More case histories are needed of politics on the state level. If comparable volumes are as soundly grounded as is Kirwan's in newspapers, official records and manuscripts, and if they are marked by as careful evaluation, they will indeed be welcome. Scholars making similar studies should strive to make more vivid than Kirwan does the personalities of the second-level politicians. Vardaman and Bilbo, except for their pre-political background, stand out in the round; the countless other actors on the gloomy Mississippi political stage tend to be indistinct and shadowy.

James Harvey Young, Emory University.

San Martín the Liberator, by J. C. J. Metford. New York. Philosophical Library, Inc. 1950. pp. xi, 154. \$3.75.

The centenary of the death of José de San Martín (1950) and the visit of the author to the homeland of that great American

patriot prompted this little biography. The author himself disclaims credit for adding much that is new to the San Martín story, though there are some new lights which come from his study of the Public Record Office. He has written a life of the South American patriot for popular consumption and this purpose it well fulfilled. He has been careful to include contemporary views by English observers, and it is well known that his countrymen were often on the Latin American scene in the days of the wars of independence. Their favorable as well as their unfavorable judgments help to throw San Martín into perspective. The author has also drawn on the observations of the occasional North American whose path crossed with that of the Argentine. This is a useful little book and may well serve to awaken an interest in the man which will lead a reader deeper into story and farther afield into a fascinating period of American history.

John Francis Bannon, Saint Louis University.

The Story of Canada, by George W. Brown, Eleanor Harmon, and Marsh Jeanneret. Boston. D. C. Heath and Company. 1949. pp. xiii, 434. \$3.00.

While it is not the policy of the Historical Bulletin to review books intended for use in the grade school, occasionally there appears a work that is deserving of special mention. The *Story of Canada* is such a production. Here is a successful attempt to combine the art of story telling with the more prosaic task of giving the essential facts of history. A serious attempt has been made to coordinate the history of Canada with the history of the United States. In preparing the book the authors visited every province of Canada, and some of the illustrations are taken from personal observation. These illustrations and those gathered from other sources for the work make it especially useful to every class of student. There are also some well chosen and simply executed maps that enhance the value of the book. A good index completes the work.

E. R. Vollmar, Saint Louis University.

CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is intended to be of service to teachers and students of history by presenting a fairly complete list of historical works announced or published since the previous issue of *The Historical Bulletin*. An asterisk denotes a review of the book in this or a later issue. Unfortunately sometimes the price and number of pages is not announced.

MEDIEVAL

- Brandon, Samuel G., *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church*. Macmillan. pp. 304. \$5.00.
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